

# JPRS Report

# West Europe

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### WEST EUROPE

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DENMARK

GREENS' CHANCES OF ENTERING NEXT PARLIAMENT INCREASING

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 10 May 87 p 27

[Article by Jørgen Goul Andersen. Jørgen Goul Andersen, assistant professor at the Institute for Political Science at Århus University, is an expert on the conduct of the electorate. On the basis of data from AIM, among others, Goul Andersen has, for several years, made studies of the population's political positions and attitudes on issues that mark the debate. Goul Andersen is now attached to DET FRIE AKTUELT and will regularly undertake and comment upon opinion analyses.]

[Text] The Greens are a party to be taken seriously. The party has been gaining steady support till 1987 and, according to the opion polls, is now for the third time going beyond the limit of votes barring access to the Folketing. The first time was after the municipal elections, in December 1985, the second time after Chernobyl, in June 1986. But who are actually these Green voters? On the basis of a number of polls, a preliminary indication may be provided.

#### A Young Party

The Greens are primarily a young party. Nearly 50 percent of the supporters of the party are below the age of 30. In the other young party, the Socialist People's Party, the figure is only 30 percent—in all other parties around 15 percent. That seems to indicate that time works in favor of the Greens. About 5 percent of the 18-29-year-old voters and 8 percent of first-time voters will vote for the party.

On the other hand, the social profile of the party is very unclear--for example, there seems to be equal support among skilled workers as among salaried employees within the public sector. This even despite the fact that the supporters of the Greens are primarily women--54 percent.


#### Positions

The polls on the positions of the Green voters are very uncertain as they are based on very few respondents. But they seem to indicate that the Greens, naturally, take up extreme positions on all Green issues (environment, security

policy, short-range democracy, etc.), while on other issues their positions are somewhat to the left of those of the Social Democratic Party.

Where Do the Greens Come From?

That corresponds very well with the party-policy background of the Greens. The gains of the Greens have, in particular, hurt the Socialist People's Party and the Radical Liberal Party, as well as, secondarily, the Left-Socialist Party and the Social Democratic Party. Altogether, they account for upwards of 80 percent of the Green voters who voted in the 1984 election. Confer table.



1. Percentages for coalition parties + the Radical Liberal Party Key:

1. Percentages for opposition parties (including the Progressive Party)

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SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S PARTY CHIEF DISCUSSES PARTY'S STATUS

Post-Election With SDP

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 17 May 87 p 6

[Interview by Erik Meier Carlsen and Jørgen Flindt Petersen]

[Text] Gert Petersen is chairman of few people, but they have got all the say. He wants to ruin the economy of his voters but believes in a larger "horizon, oriented toward the society" on the part of the educator, the school teacher and librarian than on the part of the LO [Federation of Trade Unions] worker.

[Question] Gert Petersen, what are the necessary conditions for a government cooperation with the Social Democratic Party?

The chubby survivor and party chairman of the Socialist People's Party for more than a decade takes a cigarette and looks composed.

[Answer] That there is agreement on everything and not just on sections of the policy. All ministers in a government are responsible for the total policy.

Chairman Petersen is at a press meeting at DET FRIE AKTUELT, a newspaper publishing house he has not previously visited in his career. He is interviewed by Jørgen Flindt Petersen, chief editor, and Erik Meier Carlsen, political reporter.

[Question] If so, would that government not be entirely unlikely?

[Answer] It depends on what the world looks like after the election. We consider it a prerequisite that the workers' parties, primarily the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist People's Party, are in the majority. And if our viewpoints are extremely strongly supported by the voters, the Social Democratic Party will be forced to make concessions to us. I do not find it quite as unlikely, but in the light of the reports received so far, it does not appear to be the most likely possibility.

[Question] You thus take a pessimistic view of a joint government today?

[Answer] Yes.

Cooperation Agreement

[Question] Would it then not be more reasonable to take a lower aim, thus aiming at a cooperation agreement, so that you do not create disappointments and a bad atmosphere?

[Answer] We state very clearly that a joint government is best but that it is very possible that we shall have to make do with a formalized cooperation.

[Question] Are there ministerial posts that you know ahead of time you will not get?

[Answer] I do not want to discuss that question. Last summer we got into such a discussion, and some of our own members got the impression that we were interested in the ministerial posts because of the posts themselves.

[Question] But you know that there are posts that are particularly sensitive to the Social Democratic Party.

[Answer] In principle, this is entirely unacceptable. But beyond that I do not want to discuss it.

[Question] Are you members not mature enough to discuss the very important power inherent in ministerial posts?

[Answer] It is a widely held opinion among the population that there is something obnoxious about Folketing posts and ministerial posts, and that has quite unjustifiably left its mark on our party as well.

[Question] Ought you not then to take action against it?

[Answer] It is not worth creating a major conflict on it.

Surprised

[Question] What is your opinion of the request on the part of the Federation of Trade Unions for pre-election negotiations between the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist People's Party?

[Answer] Positive. I am somewhat surprised, for the deputy chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions recently charged the Social Democratic Party with complying too much with the requests of the Socialist People's Party.

[Question] Does that make you suspect ulterior motives?

[Answer] There probably are ulterior motives. That is entirely unimportant.

We are interested in such talks. We have time and again requested such talks of the Social Democratic Party, but each time they have rejected the idea. I do not care anymore. But if the Federation of Trade Unions establishes a contact, it will be a positive development, regardless of the motive.

[Question] Do you have no idea what the ulterior motive might be?

[Answer] Yes, I do. But I am not going to reveal it.

[Question] Large sections of the Social Democratic Party probably want to subjugate you—as Per Hækkerup put it—in order to deprive you of popularity and support?

[Answer] Yes, but that is very naive. But it is, no doubt, Social Democrats, who have such ideas.

[Question] Is it not true that two parties which are very much alike, such as the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist People's Party, and which will compete for the support of the same population group may find it difficult to create a lasting alliance?

[Answer] That is a very interesting question. It very much corresponds with a Social Democratic or a Communist party position. They say: "We represent one class and may thus ally ourselves with other classes." But that kind of analysis no longer applies in a modern society with Denmark's structure.

The class comprising the people living by their labor force accounts for 85 percent of the population, but they are divided into groups selling their labor force on widely different conditions. It is not strange that no single party can represent them all. In a number of West European countries there are two major parties which represent various groups in the same class. That is why an alliance among various parties within the class of wage earners and salary receivers is not unnatural.

#### Heretic

[Question] I suppose you regard yourselves as more left-wing oriented than the Social Democratic Party. Is it not a paradox that the Social Democratic Party represents the LO workers, while you represent the groups of salaried employees?

[Answer] That is not entirely wrong but somewhat superficial.

We have got no particular impact among the cadres—and, here, I do not merely have in mind the top of LO, but polls taken among LO workers give us fairly good support. But the thought it not entirely wrong, and I would like to add a heretic remark, viz., that many of the new groups of wage earners and salary receivers have got an outlook that is more oriented toward the society than ordinary industrial workers.

For example, on account of their work, a librarian, a kindergarten teacher or a nurse are forced to take an interest not only in their own pay and

working conditions but also in the living conditions and circumstances of the people with whom they get into contact. It is not the same thing with industrial workers.

[Question] Is there not an enormous risk that the joint understanding between the new groups and the weakest within the society nevertheless may be based on an egoistic interest among those employed within the public sector in expanding the system with more institutions and more people to treat the society.

[Answer] That is another aspect. It is a problem that naturally exists, but it also exists in conjunction with certain industries.

#### Shipyards

[Question[ As, for example, the shipbuilding industry, which the Social Democratic Party would not like to reduce, as little as you would like to reduce the public sector?

[Answer] We do not like either to make cutbacks in the subsidies to shipyards. There is disagreement on this issue within the party, but it is my personal view and the official position of the party that the subsidies to shipyards will have to be viewed from the point of view of profitability to the society. One has to evaluate concretely if there is a possibility to absorb the labor force.

[Question] Is it not your opinion that it will be necessary for the private sector to grow in proportion to the public sector?

[Answer] Yes, but I do not find that it has got any relevance in this context.

[Question] Is there not a competition on resources?

[Answer] I believe that there is something of a myth in this respect. There is no definite sum available. We have no certainty that available mone; will be invested in this country.

[Question] But the alternative to limiting the public expenditures is presumably a drastic reduction of the private consumption possibilities in order to achieve a balance of payments equilibrium?

[Answer] Neither the public nor the private consumption must be too large, but it cannot be old-age pensioners, the unemployed and those in low-paying jobs who have to make the cutbacks. I find that it will have to be the most affluent 25 percent of the population.

#### Consumption Cutbacks

We want a social redistribution, not just from the point of view of justice and the state finances but also in order to limit the private consumption where it is largest. [Question] By how much?

[Answer] I cannot make any statement on this. I am no economist.

[Question] It will also involve large sections of your own voters?

[Answer] I am aware of this. I had an interview in the press of the Left 3 months ago under the heading: "Those making upwards of 200,000 kroner have no interest in voting for the Socialist People's Party." I want to say "no economic interest."

[Question] Is there not a latent conflict here?

[Answer] Yes, there probably is, but I do not believe that it is of essential importance, it does not affect our policy.

One of the worst things one can do is to win an election on promises one cannot meet. Then rather lose.

[Question] Are you afraid of making too big gains.

[Answer] No, we have not made promises we cannot meet.

[Question] But each time you have been involved in a concrete cooperation, your party has been split up?

[Answer] We certainly survived the spring of 1982 quite well, when we carried through annoying increases in indirect taxes and the like.

[Question] What is your view today of the situation in 1979, when the executive committee was in disagreement with the Folketing group on how to negotiate with the Social Democratic Party on the profit-sharing proposal.

[Answer] I disagreed with the executive committee at the time and voted against it. When one has got a democratic structure, wrong decisions are made, one has got to live with that.

Wrong Decision

[Question] Much would have looked different, we might have avoided Schluter?

[Answer] I doubt that the world would have been essentially different, but, at any rate, I find that it was a wrong decision.

[Question] But do you not have a special problem because your extremely powerful party organization only has a membership of 8-9,000 behind it and thus much, much less than your electorate? Is the very party structure in a critical situation?

[Answer] It is no good sign, but I do not know what to replace it by. But after all, the party organization is a limited group whom one consults and to whom one is accountable. The voters are a much more indeterminable group and everybody can refer to their support. But I too find it a critical problem.

[Question[ What is your view of a situation in which the Left-Socialist Party becomes part of the majority?

[Answer] The Left-Socialist Party will hardly participate neither in the government nor in a formalized cooperation, but as far as I know the Left-Socialist Party, and my knowledge is largely based on the three members of the Folketing, I believe that it is feasible. The Left-Socialist Party is more close to earth than it used to be.

The Greens

[Question] What about the Greens?

[Answer] I am much more uncertain about them. I will at any rate warn them against trying to turn political negotiations into some kind of auction where one cooperates with the highest bidder. They will not succeed in that.

[Question] But in such a situation one would presumably have to seek to form another government than the Schluter government?

[Answer] A majority dependent upon the Greens will not be a workers' majority, we would be in largely the same situation as in the spring of 1982. And in that situation we had to seek to cooperate with the Radical Liberal Party as well. It is no happy situation, we will point to a Social Democratic minority government, possibly with support from the Greens and the Radical Liberal Party.

Schluter's Craft

[Question] Could we persuade you to say a couple of nice words about Schluter?

[Answer] He is an extremely capable political craftsman. Anker Jørgensen keeps repeating ad nauseam that a cooperation between the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist People's Party will have to be formed on the basis of the program of the Social Democratic Party. Schluter would not dream of saying that the Four-Leaf-Clover government would have to function on the basis of the program of the Conservative Party.

[Question] Perhaps Anker Jørgensen is not interested in the cooperation--or he may be afraid of frightening some of his voters?

[Answer] That is possible, but it is not wisely said, for people cannot understand it, they do not find it reasonable.

[Question] Is it a particular problem for an alliance between the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist People's Party that you regard Anker Jørgensen as a poor political craftsman?

[Answer] [A pause of 6 seconds] I do not interfere in decisions on the selection of the head of the Social Democratic Party.

[Question] Is he a poor political craftsman?

[Answer] I can make no statement on that. Unfortunately, he is not as good as Schluter.

Jørgensen Lauds Party Congress

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 18 May 87 p 1

[Article by If & vv: "Anker Jørgensen Satisfied with National Congress of Socialist People's Party"]

[Text] But the chairman of the Social Democratic Party still does not want to enter into negotiations on a government coalition with the Socialist People's Party prior to the elections.

The chairman of the Social Democratic Party, Anker Jørgensen, is quite content with the outcome of the national congress of the Socialist People's Party, but he still does not see a need for the two parties to meet prior to the elections with a view to "removing a couple of obstacles," as Gert Petersen, chairman of the Socialist People's Party put it.

"I find it excellent that the moderates have got the upper hand within the Socialist People's Party, but I do not find that it sets the stage for new agreements between the two parties," Anker Jørgensen tells INFORMATION.

The chairman of the Social Democratic Party attaches importance to the fact that the statement by the Socialist People's Party on the workers' majority largely has the same objective as that of the Social Democratic Party on a "future coalition between the Social Democratic Party or a Social Democratic government."

But Anker Jørgensen nevertheless mentions two concrete items, the labor market policy and the defense policy where, in his opinion, considerable problems may arise.

First, that the Social Democratic Party may conceivably respect the 4-year collective agreements that have been entered into both in the private and the public sectors, where the national congress of the Socialist People's Party adopted a resolution to the effect that a workers' government as the employer of the public sector already in 1989 shall offer public employees a 35-hour work week.

"But we agree on a 35-hour work week, but it ought only to be implemented in the next collective agreement period," says Anker J $\phi$ rgensen.

Unchanged Defense

In addition, Anker Jørgensen objects to intervening in collective agreements by having the Folketing adopt a low-pay protection arrangement and a guaranteed minimum wage, which the Socialist People's Party also propose.

In addition, the chairman of the Social Democratic Party sticks to the proposal of the party for an unchanged defense budget with built-in adjustments for salary, wage, and price increases.

The national congress adopted that the party will work for a reduction of the defense budget by 10 percent in the coming government period and for a new calculation of the adjustment, so that it only follows the Danish price and salary and wage levels and not as today the cost of imported materiel.

"The Socialist People's Party has probably regarded the adoption of a new adjustment as a minor cutback, but we are still of the opinion that our proposal is the right one," says Anker Jørgensen, adding that the total proposal of the Socialist People's Party "in reality seems to be within the framework of Denmark for the Entire People," which is the Social Democratic proposal.

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FINLAND

#### SKDI PANEL UNEXPECTEDLY POSTPONES NAMING KIVISTO CANDIDATE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 18 May 87 p 11

[Text] The SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] has postponed the nomination of Gov Kalevi Kivisto as the party's presidential candidate for 3 weeks. SKDL first secretary Reijo Kakela gave the wishes of foreign policy makens as the reason for postponing a party decision on the candidate.

Kakela told the SKDL Council that individual artists and scientists have announced that they are prepared to support Kivisto in the presidential elections, but secret supporters have asked that a decision on the candidate be postponed. SKDL leaders were unwilling to mention the names of the new supporters, not even to the SKDL Council. The supporters themselves wished that their names not yet be revealed.

A meeting of the SKDL Council has been called for 11 June to decide on the nomination of Kivisto as a candidate. The SKDL's biggest member organization, the Finnish Communist Party, is to start its own congress the day after the SKDL Council meeting.

Last November the SKDL Council decided to ask Kivisto to consent to being their presidential candidate. According to the original plan, they had intended to nominate Kivisto as their candidate at the SKDL Council congress this May.

In the SKDL they are planning an election campaign for Kivisto that will differ from the other campaigns. It is precisely people who come from outside the domain of day-to-day politics who are to serve as election campaign assistants. The Social Democrats employed a similar model in the last presidential elections, at which time there were also independent elector candidates in Mauno Koivisto's election coalition and in his appeals Koivisto called on well-known names ranging from nonsocialists to Communists.

At the SKDL Council meeting Kakela said that, if there were a chance of expanding the election campaign base, organizations or parties that promote their own political interests would not be involved.

Kakela was primarily alluding to the minority Communist election party, the Democratic Alternative (DEVA), which has unofficially offered to cooperate with the SKDL in the presidential elections.

Hanging Around Waiting for the Social Democrats

The postponement of a decision on Kivisto's candidacy means that the Social Democrats will have to adopt a stance on the presidential candidate issue before the SKDL decides. The SDP [Social Democratic Party] congress will be held a few days before the SKDL Council congress.

The decision on a presidential candidate is not officially on the SDP congress agenda, but last November the SDP Council reached the decision to ask current President Mauno Koivisto to be their candidate. Koivisto has not yet announced his plans for staying on.

Inside the SKDL they are of the opinion that hanging around waiting for the Social Democrats to come to a decision also influenced the postponement of a decision on Kivisto's candidacy. There has been a slight difference of opinion on the candidate issue in the SKDL's own ranks. Among others, Member of Parliament Esko Seppanen (Communist) has announced that he will support Koivisto in the elections.

But supporters have been moving in Kivisto's direction too. Kasela and Assistant Professor Lars D. Eriksson, who is a member of the SKOL administration, have entered into discussions with people in the worlds of culture and science who backed Koivisto in the last presidential elections. In the SKOL they suspect that as many as many ters of former Koivisto supporters who are fed up with his "consensus policy" may come to back Kivisto.

Politically committed and independent people take part in these discussions. Supporters of the DEVA and the Greens are qualified to participate as private individuals.

Kalevi Kivisto has not himself taken part in the discussions, but he is very enthusiastic about his new supporters. Kivisto, who is serving as governor of Keski-Sucmi Province, has announced that he would prefer not to start his election campaign before late in the fall. Kivisto will probably go on an official leave of absence from his gubernatorial duties for the duration of the election campaign.

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CSO: 3617/100

FINLANL

COMMUNISTS IN CONSTRUCTION WORKERS UNION WAGE LEADERSHIP FEUD

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 18 May 87 p 10

[Article by Anna-Riitta Sippola]

[Text] On Sunday the Construction Workers Union unanimously elected Pekka Hymonen (Communist) its new chairman. On the last day of the union congress they got to vote once the Communists had disentangled their internal relations.

The Stalinists were once again excluded from the union leadership. The moderate Communists stated as the reason, among others, for the purges the fact that the Stalinists had taken their differences on the conduct of the union congress elections to the municipal court to be resolved. In the opinion of the majority, this has put a damper on the internal atmosphere of the union.

Now giving up his duties as chairman, Aarno Aitamurto (Communist) was of the opinion that they are moving toward more peaceful times in the Construction Workers Union in terms of settlements of the Communists' internal differences, although this development is a slow one. Aitamurto sharply criticized the Stalinists for wanting to take their own organization's affairs to court by informing on it during an election.

Union secretary Hannu Alanoja (Social Democrat) was reelected to his post. In the course of the congress Alanoja also had to listen to criticism from his delegation comrades because of his poor showing in the union congress election. During the press conference held as a conclusion to the union congress, Alanoja conceded that the Social Democrats' actions had made things more difficult for them, among other reasons because the SDP [Social Democratic Party] entered into a government coalition with the Conservative Party.

Matti Ojala (Communist) was also unanimously reelected second chairman of the Construction Workers Union. They had to conduct the election of the new union executive committee by secret ballot at the demand of the Stalinists, but the demand for a vote by ballot on the election of the council was, nevertheless, withdrawn.

Following the decisions made on Sunday, the Communists hold a majority of sents (20 to 5) on the Construction Workers Union executive committee and on the union council (40 to 11).

Hyponen Will Continue to Follow the Course Charted by Aitamurto

The new chairman of the Construction Workers Union, Pekka Hymonen (Community), is one of those men who does not especially strive for anything, but who are nevertheless chosen.

On Sunday the Construction Workers Union promoted Eymonen to the challmanship of the SAK [Central Federation of Finnish Trade Unions], replacing Admo Aitamurto (Communist) who moves to the number-two soot. Hymonen is the union's long-term legal expert. Aitamurto is also a lawyer by training.

The choice was confirmed as early as Thursday, when the Construction Workers Union's Communist delegation decided to back Hyponen.

The Communists constitute a majority in the 103,000-member SAK Construction Workers Union. According to union tradition, the majority delegation chooses the chairman and the minority--that is, the Social Democrats in the Construction Workers Union--does not interfere in the matter.

According to Communist Party (SKP) tradition, on the other hand, the chairman of the biggest Communist-led union, the Construction Workers Union, is a member of the SKP Central Committee; that is, a seat will soon be made available to Hynonen there too. So far, he has performed his party duties only in his own department.

Hynonen says that he has always followed the main party line. In the Construction Workers Union he promises to continue to follow the course charted by Aitamurto.

Mynomen is a 42-year-old "assistant judge" [has passed the par exams and has some court experience]. The farmer's son from Leppavirta's interest is communism was kindled during his student days in the wild 1960's. He entered the Construction Workers Union straight from the lecture halls of the faculty of law in 1971.

Hynonen has not done any construction work. "At first I wondered now a non-construction worker like me would get along with them, but I naticed that the union office was full of professional construction workers. I could ask them," Hynonen recalled his early days in the union.

Hynonen said that it was very late that it became clear to him that he was going to be the chairman of the union. "When it became evident that Altomatic was going to leave for the SAK, rank-and-file activists said: 'You're going to become chairman'; that is, of course, I had to consider the idea, but the confirmation did not come until last week," Hynonen said.

He has become familiar to the fank and file because he trained nearly the whole contingent of union shop stewards in courses given at the union's institute in Silkaranta.

Eynonen emphasized that he was satisfied that the Communist delegation was unanimous in choosing him. An eightenan committee, the members of which were

chosen by Aitamurto, laid the foundation for the choice. Aitamurto did not officially participate on the committee.

Readily smiling and fast talking, Hynonen has been a key man in construction industry labor negotiations for about 20 years now. These negotiations have often been rigorous. The last time the construction workers were on strike was a year ago. According to Hynonen, the men do not bicker, that is, there is no problem with relations at the negotiating table, but a clash in terms of attitudes is inevitable when Communist and capitalist construction organizations meet.

Hynonen did not admit to their being any similar ideological-political conflicts at home. Hynonen's lawyer wife is a Social Democrat. They live in East Pakila in Helsinki. Their two sons are 9 and 15 years of age.

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KKE CONGRESS VIEWED: INABILITY TO ADAPT PERCEIVED

Moscow Line

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 10 May 87 pp 8-9

[Article by Sp. Linardatos]

[Text] Congresses, especially those of the parties of centralization but not only these, usually constitute the solemn confirmation, the official pronouncement, of decisions that have already been made in more restricted bodies and organs, of correlations that have already been ruled on in the course of pre-congress proceedings, and perhaps even earlier. But we can say especially of the 12th Congress of the KKE--which will begin the day after tomorrow--that its leaders themselves have already taken the trouble to dispel the delusions and illusions of those who were expecting sensational changes in the policy or in the more general orientations and internal functioning of this party, which ranks third at the ballot box, and historically ranks first in our country.

Following the much-discussed speech by the secretary general of the KKE, Khar. Florakis, at the Peace and Friendship Stadium on 23 February, at a truly impressive gathering of members, officers, friends of the party, and representatives from other parties, one of the reputed "renewalist" leaders of the KKE said with chagrin to his friend: "Again we have bungled it."

In fact, Khar. Florakis, who—it should be noted—is not considered and is not actually one of the "hard—liners" of the KKE, had done what he could to give reassurances (to whom? to the traditional leaders of the KKE who are very uneasy about Gorbachev's "revolution," or to those intermediate officers of the party and the KNE [Greek Communist Youth] brought up with Third—International notions of the interwar period?) that almost nothing is changing. He proclaimed that the KKE remains faithful to the "dictatorship of the proletariat"—which was not referred to in the "positions" for the 12th Congress—that it understands the multiparty system to mean one without those parties it itself would characterize at any time as representing the oligarchy, and that it approves of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, as it did earlier the one in Czechoslovakia, and he avoided referring even once to the name of Gorbachev.

#### Confession of Dependence

A basic and revealing characteristic of the conservatism and rigidity of the KKE, which is unable to follow along with developments either in the worldwide communist movement or in the European Left, is the interpretation that at least the more authentic representatives of the KKE leadership have given to the "perestroika" [Russian term: "reorientation"] (Florakis, Tsolakis, Farakos, Aleka Paparriga, and others). Their whole effort was to "demonstrate"--contrary to all the shocking things that the secretary of the CPSU himself and other officers of the Soviet party as well as top-ranking Soviet leaders in science and technology have revealed about the stagnation of the economy, of theory, and of artisitic creation, and the phenomena of corruption of parties and governmental officers, and so forth--that there was no crisis in the Soviet Union and that it was merely the case that now, with the decisions of the 27th Congress of the CPSU, an "acceleration of the development of the Soviet society," the "development of socialist democracy," and so forth are being undertaken.

On the other hand, because they cannot ignore all the disturbing things revealed by the forceful criticism by Gorbachev himself and the other protagonists of the "perestroika," the KKE leaders are being obliged to answer the question of why they approved of and applauded Soviet domestic and foreign policy for so many years, whether under the leadership of Stalin, or Khruschchev, or Brezhnev and Chernienko. And what guarantees of genuine independence can they give as a party, when they are ready to agree with any policy or theoretical elaboration, with any decision that comes from Moscow?

The answer that they give to this question is surprising for its hypocrisy, but at the same time it is a confession of an abdication of their capacity for an independent course on many international issues, and for participating in more general studies of the great theoretical and practical problems of our times. More bluntly than Khar. Florakis, the alternate member of the Political Office, Aleka Paparriga, confesses that even if tomorrow Gorbachev is overthrown and denounced for mistakes, they will hasten again to agree with the new official Soviet line:

"One could ask why we have not spoken earlier about the specific weaknesses that have appeared in those years of stagnation"—she replies to a question from an editor of the RIZOSPASTIS. "But the knowledge and the power to know of a party cannot go beyond the level of awareness that any party has about its own country. And if 10 years from now it turns out that in the present effort of reconstruction some mistakes or omissions have been made, will we be denounced perhaps because we are supporting without reservation our Soviet comrades in this gigantic work?....We are and remain faithful to the principle of non-intervention in the policy of another party in its country"

#### Opportunistic About-face

These proclamations and excuses would not have been hypocritical if the leaders of the KKE were to have said clearly: "We are always in agreement

and in solidarity with the leadership of the CPSU at any time, even when it turns against all other communist parties."

In order to substantiate this, we do not even need to recall the denunciation of Tito as a "lackey of imperialism," nor the approval of the intervention in Czechoslovakia that resulted in the bloodshed of the "Prague spring."

A simple skimming over of the "positions" for the 10th and 11th Congresses of the KKE is enough. Can it be the case that the attacks against "Eurocommunism" and the "Eurocommunists" and the charges that the communist parties of Italy, France, Spain, and so forth are possessed by "opportunistic notions" and are "damaging the cause of socialism and peace" (positions for the 10th Congress, page 128, for the 11th Congress, pages 17-18, and elsewhere), or the volleys fired against the Chinese leadership for having an "anti-Soviet, chauvinistic, and sectarian policy" (positions for the 10th Congress, page 9, and elsewhere), and for encouraging the "cold-war policy of imperialism" (positions for the 11th Congress, page 2) all constitute a manifestation of solidarity with the other communist parties?

But referring to the positions of the KKE vis-a-vis the other communist parties would be unfair and incomplete if we did not note also that precisely on this issue an about-face has now been seen and that there has been an accommodation to the "spirit of Gorbachev": If we except certain insinuations (1981) against the Italian Communist Party because of an earlier statement by Berlinguer that the socialist revolution in the countries of "Soviet-style socialism" has lost its motivating power, there are no attacks against the other communist parties. But given that this about-face is not the result of an analysis within the KKE itself, but a conformation to the Soviet line, nothing assures us that the attacks will not begin again if for any reason the Communist Party of the Soviet Union reverts on this issue to the old excommunications and condemnations of other communist parties.

#### The "New" Strategy

An about-face is being seen also in the attitude of the KKE with respect to the other Greek parties, even the ND, in words and in action. And perhaps this turn is not merely the result of the change in the Soviet Union, but also the result of developments in Greece and of the new strategy of the "alignment of the leftist and progressive forces for a change in the direction of socialism" that the KKE has now charted. Let us not forget that one of the chief points of the KKE's attack against "rightist revisionism" in our country--that is, against the KKE-Int. and the EDA--was a position by these leftist parties in favor of cooperation with the ND to ward off the dangers of a new deviation and to consolidate democracy in the early years following the reform of the government (see also positions for the 10th Congress, pages 87-90). Indeed, now that these dangers have vanished or at least have diminished significantly, the KKE does not hesitate to cooperate with the ND in many sectors, even in municipal elections, as well as with PASOK itself in other cases, but frequently it also works against PASOK. But now this policy is not the consequence of a deeper analysis or a belief in the need to confront more general national dangers, to strengthen the institutions, and to overcome the old divisive and civil-war syndromes,

as is the case with the small parties on the Left, but instead the result of petty-politics calculations. We see this frequently also in its vacillations on the great issue of national reconciliation, in its frequent efforts to compete with the extreme Right on defamations of the civil-war dead and on shouting war-cries, and to monopolize the National Resistance of the EAM [National Liberation Front].

#### Without a Chance

The strategy of the "alignment of the leftist and progressive forces for change in the direction of socialism" constituted the main theme emphasized by the leadership of the KKE in the pre-congress discussions, and it will be the chief objective of the congress that begins the day after tomorrow. This strategy excludes PASOK from these forces of change (PASOK is excluding itself, proclaimed Khar. Florakis) and elevates as the chief leader and center of this coalition the KKE itself, which of course is trying to persuade the smaller political groupings on the Left that they will retain their autonomy and independence.

But this strategy has no hopes or chances of success, for very well-known and obvious reasons.

Firstly, because it persuades almost nobody in Greece that this idea constitutes a proposal for sharing power. With the situation that has now developed in our country, following about 6 years of governing by PASOK, with the objective difficulties that the party and the administrations of A. Papandreou have encountered and the mistakes that they have committed and continue to make, with the movement toward conservatism that is continuing in Europe, all the forces on the Left together need to make colossal efforts if they are to avert the return to power of the ND in the coming elections. The exclusion (or self-exclusion, according to the KKE) of PASOK, which in 1981 and 1985 managed to rally around it the bulk of the leftist and centrist voters and which still retains a significant influence on these forces, makes the strategy of the KKE self-contradictory as a proposal for sharing power.

Secondly, because even if there was still hope at some stage that a similar coalition with the KKE as the main force could obtain the majority of votes of the electorate—and this is unlikely—this development would run up against the well—known geopolitical realities and international correlations of forces as have developed in the period since World War II. Most people are aware of this reality in this country, which aside from its other tribulations in earlier times has experienced recently the results to the economy of the country from a mere air—travel directive by President Reagan, or from a threat concerning a sortie of the (Sismik) in the Aegean.

Thirdly, the smaller parties on the Left--and especially those that give preeminent value to democracy, have a clear European orientation, and look upon the unification of Europe as a prerequisite for overcoming a bipolar situation and for social progress and some prospects of a socialist transformation with freedom and peace--certaintly agree to cooperation with

the KKE on specific issues such as those involving trade unions, municipal affairs, and so forth, and even for the sake of countering the arrogance and single-party attitude of PASOK. But they do not accept the KKE, with its present positions, orientations, and dependencies, as the main force in such a power bloc.

#### There Is No Trust

But one could say that the strategy of alignment would be capable of being accepted, not as a proposal for sharing power, but as a way to upgrade the role of the "Left beyond PASOK" in our political affairs. But even such an agreement—that is, a new unity in this sector of the Left—presupposes a long period of convergences, reexaminations of positions and methods, specific cooperative efforts, and the creation of a climate of mutual trust, which does not exist at present. The positions of the KKE on the major problems of independence, democracy, human rights, statism, and of every type of centralism are a substantial obstacle to such a course. What is clear is that certain "renewal" forces within the KKE itself are understanding this more and more (see also a speech by Androulakis on state enterprises, RIZOSPASTIS, 22 March 1987). But these forces are still very weak, and their fate depends to a large degree on the progress of the "perestroika" in the Soviet Union.

#### Faulty Analysis

From an inability to analyze correctly the international and Greek reality, the KKE is committing the same mistakes as in 1963-1967.

It is now hastening again to succeed PASOK in power, as it tried to succeed the Center Union at that time. But both Greek and European experience show that the successor to the socialists, when for one reason or another they lose power, are the conservative political groupings. And these experiences confirm that the Left in Europe, both communist and socialist, must pass through difficult years yet -- no longer years of persecutions, fortunately, but of reorganization and reexaminations -- until it finds its new political cause and its new historical role in a world that has changed radically and is changing daily at an inconceivable speed. Neither the contraction of the communist parties nor the ruptures among the socialists and socialdemocrats in England and Germany (the Greens) are coincidental phenomena, surely, nor is the fact that the congresses of two large socialist parties held recently (in France and Italy) concerned themselves almost exclusively with problems of the political situation in their own countries, or with ensuring inner-party balances, with these congresses not adding even a single iota to the renewal of the socialist vision.

The 12th Congress would contribute genuine services if it were able to show that the KKE has understood to what degree the social transformation in Greece is related to the process in Europe, and that it is not going to continue to speak like a "section--blessed be its termination--of the Communist International."

#### Renewal Possibility Questioned

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 9 May 87 p 4

[Article by Rodolfos Moronis]

[Text] The 12th Congress of the Greek Communist Party, which will be held next week, is unquestionably the most talked about, within and outside the sector of the Left, that has ever been put on by this party. The other day the Committee on the Pre-congress Dialogue gave an impressive number--in relation to previous details--of written opinions that have been conveyed within roughly the last 2 months. Also impressive is the number of articles and analyses on the "positions" of the Central Committee and on the machinations within the KKE that have come into the limelight, in publications having an ideological orientation differing only slightly or absolutely from the KKE.

The presence of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Kremlin (by whom the KKE has always been inspired, as expressed by its present leadership) constitutes one of the elements and reasons why everybody is following with interest what is happening at Perisso. Indeed, the fact that the KKE, or at least a significant portion of its leading group, cannot hide its embarrassment in the face of the reversals and the iconoclastic actions of Gorbachev lends an even greater interest to the game of trying to discover the repercussions from a revolution (Gorbachev's) on a preeminently conservative party like the KKE. Here one might recall that the KKE is perhaps the last of the communist parties to break away from Stalinism--if it ever broke away from this as a mental attitude.

The "positions" of the KKE have been treated mainly in terms of more general examinations and reclassifications, and it is in the same light that there will be analyses, in all probability, of the decisions of its congress. However, there is also another angle from which the things that are happening or being discussed within the KKE ought to be looked at. The approach that has been tried up to now begins with the machinations in the Kremlin in attempting to interpret the positions that the KKE is taking even on our purely domestic issues. A reverse approach would be interesting—and would explain some things more clearly: What positions is the KKE obliged to take due to the situation in Greece, and how do these positions harmonize or differ from the atmosphere that Gorbachev has created? Because it is perhaps the first time that the KKE is developing its positions mainly on the basis of the Greek situation. Certainly not because this is the way it usually thinks, but because it is unable to adapt itself to the messages that are coming in from abroad.

But if the KKE is embarrassed vis-a-vis the "northern winds," as M. Papagiannakis would say, the entire Greek Left is also embarrassed with the things that are happening now in Greece: A party that the Left welcomed at some point as "a certain hope" and that it supported many times, PASOK, has accomplished within a very few years what all the non-"progressive" factions failed to accomplish with ideological and political arguments: To denigrate socialism, to rob of any attractiveness so-called "progressivism," and to discredit a certain policy.

Thus, the Greek Left has a need to restore the lost attractiveness of the "leftist ideology" and to fill a space that, in its view, is unoccupied in Greece. Its first task is to persuasively argue that PASOK did not belong to just this political sphere. Thus, it charges PASOK with making a "rightist turn." It forgets that it deliberately supported this party even when it disagreed with that party's choices (the culmination being the collaboration in the selection of a chairman—a selection that could not be characterized as irreproachable), and it distances itself from projects and actions that nevertheless the Left itself was asking for. Its second task is to occupy as much as possible of this space, which remains unnaturally vacant due to PASOK's "shift to the Right."

These facts explain the mobile situation that is appearing in this sector, with the creation of new configurations ("Greek Left") and movements (that of Arsenis). To a certain significant degree, what we are calling today a "crisis of the Left" in Greece is nothing but the result of PASOK's presence and its governmental policy.

Of course, the KKE is not able either to abolish itself or to change its shape. Thus, it is obliged to adopt a new language and to undertake cooperative efforts, it being certain that only in this way can it benefit to a significant extent from the realignments in the camp of the Left.

It has not mastered this new language fully as yet. Because this has required sacrifices that the KKE is not ready to make. Gorbachev speaks a new language. The KKE does not understand it and, of course, is not able to adopt it.

Thus, it has resorted to concealments ("we are not speaking about the dictatorship of the proletariat, because this is not our issue," was the excuse and revelation made by Florakis in response to objections addressed to him from an audience at a party gathering), to abstractions (in the sense that the word has in painting), and to ambiguities, hoping that such a way of speaking on its part will be the most persuasive, even if it is not clear.

On the issue of cooperative efforts, the KKE appears to be more sure of itself. Having in the past shatteringly defeated a rival through cooperation (the KKE-Int. and the "United Left"), it has no hesitations in now cooperating with others, since it knows well the art of "exploiting" and of stealing away the fruits of success.

The bad thing for the KKE is that the "Greek Left" is so new that it may make substantial mistakes. Thus, the only thing left to hope for is in connection with individual personalities or parties such as that of Arsenis. But with such "crutches," the KKE has no hopes of making a great surprise showing in the upcoming elections. And it knows this. For that reason, despite its frequent and heated verbal attacks on PASOK, it is continuing to hold open the door for the "great alignment."

12114 CSO: 3521/122 GREECE

#### ACTIVISTS IN NEW LEFTIST PARTY NAMED

Athens ENA in Greek 23 Apr 87 pp 12-13

[Article by Kostas Spyropoulos: "Who Are the New People of the New Greek Left?"; first paragraph is ENA introduction]

[Text] The new party of the Left which is being formed with Leonidas Kyrkos's KKE Int. at the core appears to be rallying those "wronged" by recent political circumstances. And it is awakening some significant people from the "Lambrakis generation."

Many are talking about the "return of the Lambrakises." Others about the "generation of the Polytechnic." What is certain is that two generations of Leftists who either were wronged by the circumstances of recent political history or were pushed out by party apparatuses are now coming to the fore next to Leonidas Kyrkos, Kostas Filinis, Andonis Brillakis and "historic leaders" B. Drakopoulos, L. Elevtheriou, and P. Dimitriou. Economist Mikh. Papagiannakis, journalist Arist. Manolakos, Professor Nikos Petralias (economics, Panteios School), and sociologist Dim. Psykhogios, all of whom belonged to no party until recently, worked with KKE Int. officials K. Filinis, P. Kounalakis, Gr. Giannaros, G. Voulgaris, and St. Pitsiorlas to draft the two basic texts for the Constituent Congress of the New Greek Left, which is the predominant name for the new party.

The nonparty people mentioned above, along with Gr. Giannaros and St. Stefanou, belong to the "Lambrakis generation," while G. Voulgaris, St. Pitsiorlas, and Sotiris Valnden belong to the "generation of the Polytechnic."

In the organizational sector—which in the nature of things will prove most critical to the new party's development—fundamental roles were played by the KKE Int.'s "Lambrakises" P. Kounalakis, Sp. Lykoudis, M. Darteiotis, and Kh. Kombolitis.

The following were also active in the mobilizing and organizing the constituent meetings: G. Toundas (he also helped draft the Charter Principles); M. Trandalidis (former KKE official); St. Bambas (former Socialist Path official); A. Pappas; Dim. Giatzoglou (member of the KKE Int. Central Committee); M. Gazis; and KKE Int. party officials Il. Ioannidis, Il. Staveris, Aspa Papathanasopoulou, K. Katiezas, Th. Kazelis, D. Vandolas. Also

participating besides the above were P. Athanasopoulos, N. Theodorakopoulou, and others.

In the field of local self-government NEA [New Greek Left] was able to present some successes, starting with the fact that it formed an organizational committee consisting of officials from the new party as well as from other parties of the Left to promote its programmatic goal of "self-government with decentralization." Elli Papakonstandinou and Pan. Papagiannis, who head the KKE Int.'s Self-government Section, and mayors B. Bekhlivanidis, G. Grigoriadis, and G. Klados were joined by three others, Sp. Arsenis (Ithaki), Dim. Vlakhos (Naousa), and K. Kourkoutis (Thiva) on the congress's Political-organizational Committee, while other mayors (mainly of provincial cities) will attend the congress as observers. The Press Office is made up of "Rigases" P. Kavasalis and Th. Margaritis as well as of D. Fyssas and G. Sarafis (former KKE officials).

Active on the journal of dialogue ANOIXI were G. Rengos and L. Axelos; also involved in the Coordinating Secretariat, besides those officials who agreed to prepare the texts, were And. Brillakis and B. Theodoridis.

In the Piraeus there were K. Kostarakos (of the antidictatorial "Rigas"), G. Belavilas, Andreas and Al. Tsourinakis, and others.

The following academics were involved, besides the "heavy artillery" of DSA President Fotis Kouvelis: K. Manolkidis (former member of the PASOK leadership) and P. Xythalis. From the unions there were D. Khatzisokratis (member of the GSEE elected administration), Or. Khatzivasileiou (former president of GSEE), G. Fysakis, P. Papakostas, and D. Athanasopoulou.

Other new officials of NEA "emerged" from the ecology movement (L. Louloudis, N. Zalaoras, and others). As for the feminist movement, it strongly criticized the "androcratic" composition of the Central Political Organizational Committee (only seven female members) and the feminists who participated in the new party formed their own political committee; issued a statement with their theses; managed to get elected to the final body with half the usual votes (to get more women to participate in the congress); and are going into the final body with an explosive proposal: to elect the Central Committee proportionately by sex. That is, if women form 30 or 40 percent of the party's members, females will correspondingly constitute 30 or 40 or 50 percent of the Central Committee.

More than 10,000 citizens participated in the constituent meetings and a bit more than half of these did not belong to any party. The congress, which opens today, is to approve the fundamental political thesis of the report: "NEA is a party which aims to gain power and will participate independently in the next parliamentary elections..."

12593

CSO: 3521/124

GREECE POLITICAL

BACKGROUND, PERSONALITIES OF REPORTED PROMET SCANDAL

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 10 May 87 pp 4-6

[Article by Mikh. Dimitriou: "What Lies Behind the Scandalmongering. The Prehistory of the Antagonisms. The Conflicts and the Groups. The Intraparty War, the People and the Causes"]

[Text] The major outburst of scandalmongering starting last Sunday has given many the impression that PASOK is on the verge of a possibly devastating intraparty conflict... Many believed that the scandalmongering is just the tip of the iceberg and that underneath there is a whole history of personal (and political?) antagonisms capable of doing great injury to the governing party. Certainly, behind the conflict between Vasc Papandreou and Giorgos Petsos it was possible to discern a far broader conflict--probably among the so-called "party people" and the "others" (which includes people ranging from Andonis Livanis to Giorgos Katsifaras--while nobody knows any longer where Menios Koutsogiorgas belongs!).

It was the appearance on the scene of Menios Koutsogiorgas (and in the role of peacemaker at that) that... deepened the confusion: did he summon him-as was reported-to Kastri to... put out a fire?

But let us start from the beginning: the "dispute" over PROMET [Processing Companies Supply Company] has brought out and widened recent antagonisms—as TO VIMA reveals today—between certain leading officials in the party apparatus and certain close associates of the prime minister.

Antagonisms that reached a climax with Kimon Koulouris and intensified with Vaso Papandreou and which are poisoning the atmosphere within the party and paralyzing all productive activity. These cannot be dispelled merely through calming assurances; formal, hearty greetings; or the use of first names. Certain people within PASOK are already talking about the inevitable future conflict between certain "party people" and "old party people," while the latest uproar appears to be intensifying Andreas Papandreou's intense reflections on a "deep cut" in the party apparatus nationwide.

The "truce" between Vaso Papandreou and Giorgos Petsos--brought about on strict orders from the prime minister (and with a mediating role by Menios Koutsogiorgas)--put an end to a serious "internal crisis" characterized by:

- 1. the decision by Deputy Minister of Industry Giorgos Petsos to "clean up" the PROMET case, which was based on his claim that "I am being shot at by party people and I have to defend myself."
- 2. the decision by Vaso Papandreou, not of course to resign from PASOK (since no leading party official ever discusses anything of that sort), but to respond to the whole administrative procedure approach and to the artful publicity given it on the second day of the 3-day May Day holiday.
- 3. the unhappy feelings of PASOK officials and supporters who--as DIMOKRATIKOS LOGOS vividly noted--believe that "we are killing ourselves with this scandalmongering."
- 4. the nonexistence for all practical purposes of any mechanism to resolve the "disagreements at the top."

But what is the prehistory of this whole incident? What permanent friction has developed more generally, centered on Petsos's initiatives? And what role was played by people like Andonis Livanis, Menios Koutsogiorgas, and Giorgos Kasimatis?

For some time now, as TO VIMA had hinted, a group of party officials has begun to face polemics from certain power centers around the prime minister, facing accusations—in the best case—of trying to "make themselves independent" on the "model" of Kostas Laliotis and—in the worst case—of "possibly trying to overthrow the president himself." Of course, at times these polemics took the form of "ideological," "policy," or "organizational" antitheses rather than of open polemics and attacks. It is a fact at any rate that certain of these off—stage prompters have succeeded in their "original goals," i.e. to slander their victims at the highest party level, always with the alibi that "we do not have any personal ambitions." On the other hand, of course, criticism of the "old party people" had grown intense, particularly from lower and middle-grade officials in the central apparatus and MP's with distinctly personal ambitions.

Andreas Papandreou is reported to have been convinced that in some cases certain high party officials and MP's had not only legitimate personal ambitions but also a tendency toward independence, i.e. plans to create an opposition within the party (e.g. "a party within the party," supposedly with an eye on "post-Andreas" developments).

Since last February TO VIMA has been listing such attacks, both against Giorgos Gennimatas and—at that time—against Menios Koutsogiorgas. If, however, the former minister of the interior completely clarified his position through direct "explanations" (which were not needed for that matter), the others were not called upon or did not take the initiative to do the same. Not only with A. Papandreou, of course, but also with those they felt were "slandering" them.

Thus the unhappy atmosphere of antagonism (or at least suspicion) continued to spread like cancer. Apart from G. Gennimatas and Vaso Papandreou (we will see

why in detail), recent targets include (it is said that electronic devices were used at times) Kostas Geitonas, Miltiadis Papaioannou, Petros Moralis, Khr. Fotiou, Kimon Koulouris, Avgerinos Petralias, and at times Khristos Papoutsis, Stefanos Tzoumakas, Vasilis Kedikoglou, and others, all described in party jargon as "flayed by the [insider] circuit."

What charges were made against them (they have been shown to be baseless) will be obvious given what we have already said. Some were said to be collecting money to establish a new party; others to insult A. Papandreou himself; others to be getting ready to create problems in the organizations, where they are thought to have great influence (with or without polls...). Even some of their friendships were considered reprehensible!!!

The case of Vaso Papandreou and the creation of an atmosphere hostile to her (which also explains her violent response in recent days) are due to the fact that she never hid her opinion that party legality is not inconsistent with expressing a personal opinion within the organs. Equally, Vaso Papandreou never hid her opinion that "certain people want to chop off the head of anybody who gets ahead a bit in PASOK."

At the latest meetings of the Executive Office and in other party meetings Vaso Papandreou is also said to have expressed the opinion that the highest party organ does not have the decisionmaking competence which would justify its often acting like a shadow government, like certain government organs, and she actually cited the name of an adviser in the prime minister's office who directs a significant portion of government policy. "What are we waiting for?" she asked. And at one point, when the discussion focused on the issues of the problematic companies, the "resignations" at OAE [Organization for the Rehabilitation of Enterprises], and "Petsos's new policy," Vaso Papandreou found a good number of members of the Executive Office supporting her views—all but two. However, no "minute" was issued.

This aggressive stance of Vaso Papandreou's inspired the allegation that "Vaso is going to be another Laliotis," and more of the same. Charges and suspicions that were reinforced by new fabrications as to the motives of certain party people and MP's, some of whom have recently decided to draw in their horns and others not to be intimidated by the gossip and to maintain their friendships in the Chamber of Deputies and in the movement.

It should be noted that all this is simply to make clear the "pathogenesis" and poisoned atmosphere in which the recent dispute between V. Papandreou and G. Petsos arose and to make the bitterness of it understandable.

This state of "psychological disorganization" appears to have contributed far more to blowing up the matter and to creating misunderstandings than did the PROMET affair itself. Even at its latest meeting some 2 weeks ago, the Executive Office, with the prime minister present, discussed—not only organizational questions, as TO VIMA wrote last Sunday—but also the fact that the name of MP Kimon Koulouris had gotten mixed up in the Mikh. Stamatelatos embezzlement case.

The prime minister, who had received a letter from the PASOK MP, made some "procedural proposals" to deal with the mudslinging against Koulouris, in accordance with his conviction that "it is up to the courts, to which the matter has been referred." From the "minutes" of this interesting meeting we shall note only that a certain irritation definitely appeared at times and that it was not thought desirable for the PASOK Press Office to issue a special communique, which would give the impression that MP and Central Committee member Kimon Koulouris had party cover.

For his part, Deputy Minister of Industry Giorgos Petsos recently informed leading officials that "I have to clean up the PROMET affair because I want to have clean hands in what I took over from Vaso" and he did not hide his displeasure at the "Rightist policy" polemics he faced from certain nonparty people he named by name. It is indicative that Petsos is said to have responded to a request from a PASOK industry organization to facilitate the appointment of certain workers by asking as a quid pro quo that criticism (of him and his policy) by a party organization in Pella Nome be cut off.

Furthermore, Petsos told high officials of his bitterness that a close associate of his was being accused by party people of having supported and voted for New Democracy in the 1985 elections!

On the other hand of course, certain of Petsos's statements and actions, such as that in Austria (the state will retain only those problematic companies which are profitable) and his rather difficult relations with E. Kouloumbis, Kostas Simitis, and A. Peponis nourish people's impression that he is a deputy minister "with strong support" as well as impressions about his concrete intentions toward certain persons.

It is a fact that Petsos had briefed--although in a general and vague manner-the leadership of the government on his intention to order a management audit
of PROMET, with economist Khristos Dimopoulos, a man he had chosen and whom he
trusted, as the new administrator.

Thus, in his announcement last Saturday Petsos first "eliminated" acting administrator Kakavoulis, who was already carrying out a preliminary audit of PROMET, and then accompanied this replacement with a clear hint that "if blame is found, it will be assigned to those legally responsible."

This approach, the old distrust, and the impression that perhaps Petsos is being "instigated" and is "instigating" led Vaso Papandreou to counterattack. First through people around her, with claims that the entire approach is part of a shift in government policy, serves personal ends, and is due to a plot against her (attack her ethics and destroy her in the party). According to those around Ms Papandreou, this approach and the content of Petsos's statement prejudice if they do not replace the management audit procedure.

The publication last Monday of these views—more or less attributed to Vaso Papandreou by name—set off the internal crisis in the government and in PASOK. The impression was created that accounts were being settled inside the party, probably according to some plan. In her successive meetings with And. Livanis, general director of the Political Office; members of the Executive

Office; and fellow MP's, Vaso Papandreou did not hide her rage at Petsos's approach. Furthermore, she explained that the published statements simply blew up what she had said in her just indignation in a telephone conversation on Sunday.

Vaso Papandreou once again raised the issue of ethics and refused to change her view about Petsos's "new policy" and its goals. It is not true that there were threats to expel her, replace her, etc. She was simply asked for explanations. Ms Papandreou said that she would make a detailed, personal statement on the whole affair (which she has done) and take full responsibility for the contents of it. She also stated that she intended to raise the whole issue of the "dispute" and what lay behind it at the meeting of the Executive Office chaired by A. Papandreou (which did not take place).

Vaso Papandreou is reported to have made the charge that with the approach Petsos has taken he intends (and possibly has "instructions from some people") to hurt her personally as well and so to do a service "to some people."

At any rate Vaso Papandreou agreed to deny the allegations attributed to her that there is a plot against her in the PROMET affair and that a turn to the Right is being planned in economic policy (after Petsos too agreed to make a statement that he is following the same policy as his predecessor).

These two statements were made after Menios Koutsogiorgas mediated to arrange separate meetings of the two sides "before the president" and after Petsos had already had a 2-minute meeting with A. Papandreou in the Maximos House, where he is reported to have been criticized for his unfortunate handling of the affair.

Why the choice of Koutsogiorgas as mediator? The answer does not lie only in the prime minister's desire for and confidence in him.

Not only has Menios Koutsogiorgas not been characterized recently by an adversarial relationship with certain high-ranking party people, but it is actually he who has developed close and frank relations with them (always in a balanced way and with priority given to his feeling of devotion to A. Papandreou). In fact Koutsogiorgas and to some extent Ioannis Alevras are considered the ones who have attempted to eliminate the impression that there is a "tendency to doubt" in the higher levels of the party apparatus and in the parliamentary faction.

According to some assessments, which do not seem convincing, this policy of Koutsogiorgas's may indicate a conscious effort to increase his influence (e.g. over Andonis Livanis or certain party associates of Giorgos Papandreou, with whom the "traditional party people" are not on good terms). There are other, equally unconvincing "assessments" that explain this policy in terms of Koutsogiorgas's personal political plans.

It is beyond all doubt that Koutsogiorgas developed good relations with the "traditional party people" and acted to unite the party because he believes that "our division benefits only the Right." It is precisely this--generally unknown--impeccable relationship of Koutsogiorgas's with government people and

party people that led him to undertake a peacemaking initiative, at the instruction of course of Prime Minister A. Papandreou.

However, he was not the only one. A similar role--although more as a "technical legal adviser"--was played by the director of the prime minister's legal office, Professor Giorgos Kasimatis, who provided advice on the proper legal handling of the whole affair (as well as of other similar affairs). Vaso Papandreou's side, which insisted on the need for a management audit but had no confidence in "Petsos's approach," agreed to a proposal for members of the Certified Accountants Corps [SOL] to carry out the audit. At Kasimatis's suggestion the SOL itself would name three members to form the committee. Petsos too agreed to this solution and briefed the president of EOMMEKh [Hellenic Organization of Medium and Small-Size Enterprises and Handicrafts], Manolis Beteniotis (who is responsible for PROMET) to seek a management audit from the SOL, which was done that same day, last Tuesday.

What is included in the "compromise" that Menios Koutsogiorgas undertook to carry out with unceasing effort and contacts?

First of all, of course, an agreement on the management audit procedure and on the "two parties'" obligation to avoid any statements and counterstatements until the audit is complete (it will close PROMET's balance sheet for 1986). "No oil on the fire" from anybody. After the audit results are issued, of course, the "two parties" will be able to comment on the contents of it regarding those issues which may be felt to affect them. In addition, Vaso Papandreou agreed not to insist that her successor is planning "a different kind of policy" and Petsos agreed to erase his suspicions that "the party pecple in Vaso's group (!) are fighting me" and his claims that "almost everybody else is with me."

The announcement of the cease-fire no doubt stops but does not eliminate the friction and the gulf arising from the dispute between a prominent party official and a "strong deputy minister."

Some feel that the consequences of this quarrel will show up in the near future, both on the personal level (it is already considered certain that the "good will enjoyed by Petsos" will diminish) and on the policy level, particularly as regards policy related to future organizational initiatives at the next meeting of the PASOK Central Committee.

12593 CSO: 3521/124 SWEDEN POLITICAL

#### CARLSSON GOVERNMENT SUFFERING FROM SERIES OF EMBARRASSMENTS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 10 May 87 p 12

[Commentary by Sven Svensson: "Half-Time for the Government: Important Choice of Direction This Spring"]

[Text] Four government members have been talking through their hat; three have submitted such a poorly and deeply anchored proposal to the Riksdag that it looks like an emergency call at best--and for the first time, a unified standing committee on the constitution has put a "mark against" a minister for lack of openness.

That is the final result for the social democratic government after half of the election term and an unusually shaky political year.

Even Prime Minister Carlsson himself has slipped both with regard to the South Africa issue and Sweden's sale of weapons, primarily to Singapore.

Last summer, when vacationing in Gotland, Ingvar Carlsson rejected an isolated Swedish boycott against South Africa because of the apartheid policy. When the party's branch organizations began to growl, the tune suddenly changed. Now, the Swedish Riksdag has unanimously approved a law on sanctions against South Africa.

Nobel Chief Anders Carlberg admitted in VECKANS AFFARER on March 26 that the company had acted unethically in exporting weapons to Singapore.

When a radio reporter stuck a microphone in front of Prime Minister Carlsson at an airport that same day, the prime minister implied that he did not know any more than the public about the smuggling of weapons.

That statement developed into a huge mass media show and Conservative Party Chief Carl Bildt accused Carlsson of lying.

A dividing line was created in the Social Democratic Party in the fall of 1985. After former Bofors employee Ingvar Bratt went public in DAGENS NYHETER, it was clear that the Brofors leadership was suspect of illegal activities regarding sale of weapons to Singapore.

Ambassador Sverker Astrom was sent as an emissary to Singapore but he did not know how many missiles had been sold to Singapore, and the Ministry of Foreign Trade tried to assign a lawyer to investigate Bofors.

The most embarrassing fact for the Carlsson government is that an illegal export to Oman via Singapore took place in the fall of 1985 after Astrom's trip and after Anders Carlberg became the Chief Director of Bofors.

The export of Missile 70 to Singapore was made with the consent of nonsocialist governments; the Carlsson government cannot blame others for the illegal export to Oman.

"The mark against" Mats Hellstrom provides a clear parallel. Hellstrom tried to put the blame on previous governments when he in 1986 approved the export of guns to Indonesia. He was reprimanded by the standing committee on the constitution which unanimously demanded "greater openness."

#### Coastal Destroyer Escorts

Defense Minister Roine Carlsson is known for not interfering unnecessarily. In an interview in A-PRESSEN he made himself a heroic reputation. In this interview, he characterized the newly constructed coastal destroyer escorts of the Defense as "metal trappings where the naval officers stand and shine."

Many Navy Officers swallowed their morning coffee the wrong way and Roine Carlsson was forced to apologize repeatedly.

The storm now seems to have calmed down. Roine Carlsson has returned to the great silence, but he is not alone in questioning the coastal destroyer escorts during submarine hunts.

After the reactor accident in Chernobyl a little over a year ago, Energy Minister Birgitta Dahl indicated during the public anxiety that prompt abolishment of nuclear power in Sweden would be possible, and at the same time she got the Finns' goat, especially President Mauno Koivisto.

Birgitta Dahl said that the Finns had not reported the increased radioactivity fast enough.

In reality, the radioactive cloud had been such a sensitive foreign policy issue that it had in a roundabout way crossed over Sweden north to Finland. Dahl was forced to retract her criticism against Finland.

Even on the issue itself Birgitta Dahl has had to back out for LO [Swedish Federation of Labor] and Ingvar Carlsson. There will be no quick abolition of nuclear power in Sweden. The two first reactors will be closed between 1992 and 1997. First and foremost, a replacement source of energy must be found.

Swore in Church

Minister of Immigration Georg Andersson has acted with great carelessness.

To indicate that Syster Marianne of the Alsike Convent, who has sheltered many refugees from the police, is not a credible witness is like swearing in church. Of all people it is George Anderson who should know that ministers should only discuss matters they are able to stand by in the cruel official limelight.

When Finance Minister Kjell-Olof Feldt did not succeed with his plans of real interest tax, he instead slapped a one-time tax on private pension insurance.

Simultaneously, the government promised that the retirees who fared the worst would receive their share of the bounty. When it came down to it, the proposal submitted by Minister of Social Affairs Gertrud Sigurdsen implied that the ATP retirees will receive a considerably higher increases than the old-age pensioners.

With extreme distress, Sigurdsen got her proposal through for an additional increase in the base amount of 400 kroner on 1 July this year. The Center Party, which was the most in favor of the retirees who fared the worst, and saved Sigurdsen's honor.

Setback This Spring?

Minister of Education Lennart Bodstrom has a good chance of running into a setback concerning the boards of the 33 Swedish colleges. The government's proposal to do away with the current boards in the six university areas and replace them with the boards of different colleges has proven to be poorly anchored in every sense.

The government's greatest touchstone before the summer vacation is the change in the public real estate tax which will be signed by Housing Minister Hans Gustafsson and will bring the state a solid 3 billion kroner.

The government's proposal contains a formal reduction in the tax rate for rental housing and an increase in the tax rate for single family homes and vacation homes; but through a change in the taxable value, there will be a tax increase for everybody in 1988.

It is very difficult to accept increased housing costs for both the nonsocialist parties and the Left Party Communists. The fate of the government's proposal is therefore highly uncertain. It will not be passed in an unchanged form.

The nonsocialist opposition seems to want to solve the problem with increased tax values for multiple dwellings in 1988 by reducing the tax base so that there will not be any tax increase, and at the same time reject the increased tax on single family homes.

This saves even the Left Party Communists from an otherwise impossible situation when at the same time factions are fighting internally about how far Lars Werner or anybody else shall lead the party henceforth.

Lost Soul

Above all this Riksdag's disorder glides the lost soul of Kjell-Olof Feldt. During the reading of the budget in the Riksdag, he was deplorably cajoled out of a couple of billion [kroner]. He participated in promising compensation which never came to the retirees who fared the worst; he has his finger in the increased real estate tax and he has angered the wage earners organizations by threatening government income policy in the next wage negotiations.

The real estate tax will almost without a doubt force the Carlsson government to an important choice of direction this spring. The alternative is to swallow the annoyance of a defeat or to demand a vote of confidence and try to force the Left Party Communists to their knees right in the middle of a heated party leader crisis.

New elections in the middle of the summer would mean the demise of Ingvar Carlsson's reputation as a political arbitrator. In addition, the Left Party Communists would risk dropping out of the Riksdag and that the Environmental Party would take its place.

9583

CSO: 3650/147

SWEDEN POLITICAL

POLL: ENVIRONMENT PARTY SETS NEW RECORD FOR MONTH GAIN

SDP Reverses Decline Trend

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 17 May 87 pp 1, 13

[Article by Dick Ljungberg: "DN/IMU Opinion Poll: Environmental Party Sets New Record"]

[Text] DN/IMU: The Green Environmental Party Receives 7.5 Percent

The Green Environmental Party should have a good chance of exceeding the 4 percent threshold for representation in the Riksdag if the elections were to be held today. The DN/IMU [DAGENS NYHETER/INTERNATIONAL MATEMATIKAL UNION] voter barometer for April demonstrates this. The results were poor for the Center Party.

In the opinion poll, the Environmental Party receives a record 7.5 percent. To a special question, 62 percent of these party supporters answer that they would also vote for the party if the elections were to be held today. That indicates approximately 4.5 percent in an election.

Following are the results for April with the changes since March in parenthesis: The Social Democratic Party 42.5 percent(+/-0); the Conservative Party 18.0 percent (+1.0); the Center Party 9.0 percent (-1.5); the Liberal Party 17.5 (+/-0); Left Party Communists 4.5 percent (-0.5); Christian Democratic Union 1.0 (+0.5) and the Green Environmental Party 7.5 percent (+1.5).

#### New Record

The Green Environmental Party continues to rush forth in the DN/IMU voter barometer. In April, the party received 7.5 percent of the total voter support which is a an IMU record. The Center Party, under the leadership of Olof Johansson, fared poorly.

The survey covers the period of 6-29 April and consisted of 941 home interviews. All changes from the previous poll in March lie within the margin of error.

In April, the difference between the Center Party and the Christian Democratic Union became clear; the government began to have difficulties in getting its proposals through in the Riksdag and Lars Werner began to receive criticism within Left Party Communists. There was also a debate about the government and the Bofors weapons sale.

Following is the result from the April poll with the changes from the March poll within parenthesis:

The S-Bloc Largest

The Social Democratic Party 42.5 percent (+/-0); the Conservative Party 18.0 percent (+1.0); the Center Party 9.0 percent (-0.5); the Liberal Party 17.5 percent (+/-0); the Left Party Communists 4.5 percent (-0.5); the Christian Democratic Union 1.0 percent (+0.5); the Green Environmental Party 7.5 percent (+1.5) and others 0 (-1.0). The number of respondents who did not or could not indicate the "best party" is 5.5 percent, an increase of 1 percent.

This indicates that the socialist bloc continues to be the largest with 47.0 percent compared with the nonsocialists with 44.5 percent (45.5 percent including the Christian Democratic Union). The Environmental Party would therefore gain considerably if the elections were to be held today.

The Social Democratic Party has previously dropped in five IMU polls in a row after the high figures the party received after the murder of Olof Palme. Now the support for the government party remains unchanged at 42.5 percent which means that the downward trend has not been broken.

The many adversities in the Riksdag, especially for Finance Minister Kjell-Olof Feldt, does not make the future prospects any brighter. In the September elections 1985, the Social Democratic Party received 44.7 percent of the votes. When the government party assembles to hold its national congress in September, there will be exactly 1 year until the next elections.

The Conservative Party and the Liberal Party continue to fight side by side about which one will be the largest opposition party. Currently, the Conservative Party is in the lead by having received 18.0 percent of the support against the Liberal Party's unchanged 17.5 percent support. In March, Bengt Westerberg was ahead of Carl Bildt by 1/2 percent which is a difference that lies well within the margin of error.

But the Conservative Party is far off from the election's 21.3 percent; and recently, a certain nervousness has shown itself among the supporters of the Conservative Party because new Party Chairman Bildt is not considered able to arouse enthusiasm among the voters. Bengt Westerberg can, however, be pleased that in the IMU poll, the Liberal Party is stable above the 14.2 percent election figure.

The Center Party received a little push in connection with Olof Johansson taking over the party leadership from Karin Soder, but since then, it has lost support in two polls in a row, in March by 1 percent and in April by 1.5

percent. A voter share of only 9.0 percent compares with 10.1 percent election result (not including the Christian Democratic Union) which was a disaster and caused Thorbjorn Falldin's fall.

Seven Center Party members are currently sitting in the Riksdag on Christian Democratic Union votes, and they are doomed to lose their position in the 1988 elections of the party does not pull itself together. The Center Party meetings in Borgholm and Oland in June must be a proper launching for the party.

The Left Party Communists will meet for their jubilee congress next weekend. Party Chairman Lars Werner is severely criticized within the party by certain groups, for example, because the party remains in a rut in the same place. On this part, at least, the IMU criticism is correct. Ever since the elections (5.4 percent), the party has remained at or fluctuated around the 5 percent line; this time it ended up with 4.5 percent.

## Warning Issued

The Green Environmental Party is now for the fourth time in a row gaining in the IMU polls, and for the sixth time since the Chernobyl accident in the spring of 1986, the party has passed the 4 percent threshold to qualify for the Riksdag.

The IMU survey about the will to actually vote for the party which one today considers the best, which is reported in special article, shows that the Environmental Party would pass the threshold for representation in the Riksdag if the elections were to be held today.

But a warning is issued. In April 1982, the Environmental Party received 7.0 percent in an IMU poll but only received 1.7 percent in the Riksdag's elections that same fall. But at that time, the party only had one year under its belt.

### VOTER OPINION

Cannot/will not indicate "best party"	100.0	100.0 4.5	4.0	3.5							
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0							
Others	0.0	1.0	0.5	1.5							
Environmental Party	7.5	6.0	5.5	3.5	4.9						
Christian Democratic Union	1.0	0.5	1.0	2.0	1.1						
eft Party Communists	4.5	5.0	4.5	4.5	4.1						
Liberal Party	17.5	17.5	17.0	5.5	17.4						
Center Party	9.0	10.5	11.5	15.0	10.4						
Conservative Party	18.0	17.0	17.0	26.0	17.8						
Social Democratic Party	42.5	42.5	43.0	42.0	43.9						
Number of interviews and % of party support:	Apr 1987 941	Mar 1987 922	Feb 1987 932	Apr 1984 862	Mar 1987						
											Long-Term

The interviews were conducted during the period 6-29 April 1987.

The situation in the Swedish electorate is stable for most parties, but certain long-term trends can be identified. The Social Democratic Party has not been successful in breaking the negative trend demonstrated by the IMU polls ever since the survey in May, 1986. Viewed in a shorter perspective, the Center Party shows a similar negative development. The Environmental Party continues its forward trend. The highest figure ever polled for the party by IMU is 7.5 percent.


All the changes between the last and the next to last polls lie within the statistical margin of error.

Changes between two surveys in a row should be interpreted with great care if they are not specified as being statistically significant. Instead, trends during the three most recent opinion polls or differences or the relation to future trend should be observed.

The statistical margin of error for an individual poll for the Social Democratic Party is approximately 3 percent; for the Liberal Party and the Center Party approximately 2.5 percent; for the Center Party approximately 1.9 percent and for the other parties approximately 0.7-1.5 percent total.

The long-term trend is calculated as a sliding average during the last seven opinion polls.

The surveys were conducted among a random sample of Swedish citizens 18-74 years old. The people were interviewed in their homes. The question asked was: "Which party do you think is the best?" The preference was expressed with the help of "select notes" and "select envelopes."



# GRAPH:

- 1) DN/IMU POLL
- 2) Election results

The diagram shows the government parties IMU results after the last Riksdag elections in September 1985 using the election results as a base of reference.

# Environmentalists Likely in Riksdag

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 17 May 87 p 13

[Article by Sven Svensson: "Good Chances of Passing the Threshold"]

The Green Environmental Party would have a good chance of exceeding the 4 percent threshold and getting into the Riksdag if elections were to be held today. Well over 60 percent of the supporters said that they were certain that they would vote for the Environmental Party in an election which would be sufficient for the party to pass the threshold.

Today's voter barometer says, however, nothing definite about how many votes the party would receive in a real election. That depends on how the election movement will fall and what effect psychologically the 4 percent threshold has when a real deciding vote is cast in the approaching elections.

The 4 percent threshold can function both negatively and positively. It is difficult to say what the exact limit line will be in the Environmental Party. When it is impending that the Left Party Communists will end up below the 4 percent limit, there are Social Democrats who will vote for the party for tactical reasons. What happens with the Environmental Party, nobody knows with any certainty. The situation is not comparable. The social democrats vote for the Left Party Communists in order to guarantee the socialist majority in the Riksdag, but this type of tactical voting is not realistic for the voters of the Environmental Party as the party claims that it wants to remain neutral between the blocs.

In connection with voting tendency, the tradition is that it is greatest in the Social Democratic Party and the Conservative Party; that it is proportionally high among parties that have declined, as the most loyal supporters remain, and that it is lower for parties that are gaining.

In the most recent voter barometer, IMU asked the voters the following question:

"Assuming elections were to be held today, would you definitely vote for the party which ballot you just put in the envelope?"

Broadly speaking, the results follows the common pattern. The voting tendency is in descending order as follows:

Social Democratic Party	81	percent
Conservative Party	76	percent
Center Party	73	percent
Left Party Communists	65	percent
Environmental Party	62	percent
Liberal Party	60	percent

There is a certain difference between the voters who responded "uncertain" or "don't know." Of the Left Party Communists voters, 22 percent answered "don't know" and 11 percent of the Environmental Party voters. These are much higher figures than apply to other parties.

Among the Liberal Party supporters, 35 percent answered "uncertain" which is clearly the highest figure, while only 4 percent answered "don't know."

Within the bloc, 79 percent are prepared to vote socialist in an election, and 69 percent are prepared to vote for a certain nonsocialist party. The socialist bloc has 8 percent who answer "don't know;" the nonsocialist bloc has 4.5 percent. Twenty six percent of the uncertain nonsocialist voters will for the most part, probably vote for the three nonsocialist parties.

#### Setbacks for SPD Ahead

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 17 May 87 p 13

[Commentary by Sven Svensson: "Government Without Intuition Receives a Serious Blow"]

[Text] The myth about the strong socialist government has during a short period received a serious setback. In two instances, the real estate tax and the equalization of the local tax rate, it has had to back out in a humiliating manner, and more retreats are looming before the Riksdag breaks for summer vacation.

The explanation may be that the Carlsson government lacks the political agility and intuition which characterized Olof Palme's leadership.

The differences in the personal style of leadership may be a contributing factor to the setback. Olof Palme first acquired Thage G. Petersen and later Ingvar Carlsson as his personal aides. The aides prepared the political decisions but it was Olof Palme who in sticky situations made the final decisions.

Ingvar Carlsson's style of leadership is different. It consists of giving the department chiefs a great freedom of movement, and only to interfere afterwards to correct what went awry. Carlsson does not surround himself with any well-rooted personalities, and he sees himself as the government's last resource when everything else has failed.

It is easy for Finance Minister Kjell-Olof Bildt to get a wide field of action, and to a certain degree also for Foreign Minister Sten Andersson. In a way, Sweden has three prime ministers.

Certain government proposals which are submitted are not only characterized by insensitiveness but also by irregularity. In the January budget, Bildt's version is that now it was the wage earners' turn to increase their consumption; in the supplementary budget in April it was time to tighten the private consumption through high real estate tax, through high purchase tax on cars, etc.

Feldt's temperament and the chronic poor relationship between him and Finance Committee Chairman Arne Gadd continues to be a problem for the entire Carlsson government.

Another favorite theory of the "strong" social democratic government is:

We submit our own proposals in the Riksdag, regardless of what other parties think!

Even this theory now continues to receive a blow in keeping with the fact that the "strong" social democratic government actually shows itself to be a minority government which is forced to jump from left to right. The complaints from both Ingvar Carlsson and Arne Gadd only underscore this indisputable fact.

The bitter truth is that the Social Democratic Party has for a long time automatically factored the Left Party Communists in its own governmental basis. The Social Democratic Party has presumed that the Left Party Communists would never, so to say, fell a labor government.

But now an important shift might be on its way. In simple political terms, the government has moved to the right. The devaluation in 1982 created huge profits in the economy, but the high business profits are constantly interspersed with requests from Feldt to the wage earners organizations to resist wage demands.

Lower budget deficit; lower inflation and lower wage increases have been Feldt's passwords, more than the SAF's [Swedish Employers' Confederation]. The minister of industry has closed the emergency rooms, and in the companies the toil is slowly but surely being transformed to share holders and owners of convertibles.

It is not easy for the Left Party Communists to always stick with the slaughter of the holy social democratic cows of which Feldt is the primary exponent. The political shift may force the Left Party Communists in increasing dimensions to vote against social democratic proposals, even if it occurs in a discreet unity with the nonsocialist parties.

It is therefore doubtful whether there any longer exists a socialist bloc in the Riksdag. The Left Party Communists have certainly been transformed from a stalinist party into a Eurocommunist party, but in the capitalistic area there must be some moderation in the slaughter of the cows.

The political development with less integrated labor movement leads to the question:

-- are there conditions for an organized political cooperation in government position between the Social Democratic Party and the Left Party Communists?

For the sake of parliamentarism and the voters it would be of great importance to get a firm answer to the question.

Unfortunately, the basis does not allow for such unbiased scrutiny of the question of government, at least not according to today's practice. The prime minister himself decides whether the government will remain in position after a general election with loss of votes and after a new election and the speaker lets it suffice to expedite the wishes of the established parties in the government's matter.

A more comprehensive scrutiny of the government's matter, which requires a speaker who can rise above the parties, would probably show that the Social Democratic Party is divided in its position on government cooperation with the Left Party Communists, and that the Left Party Communists would probably split into at least two factions.

The communist parties in Finland, Italy and France have hardly shown themselves to be especially efficient in government when it comes down to it.

9583 CSO: 3650/147 SWEDEN

### BRIEFS

WOMEN'S POLITICAL PARTY FORMED--A new political party, a women's party which also welcomes men, has been formed in Orebro. The party is in the process of writing a party program which covers a wide area, primarily issues that concern children, young people, work, environment and housing. This week, the party will contact the Icelandic Women's List in order to get assistance in opening stages of the party work. It is expected that next year the party will be prepared to enter three different elections. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 19 May 87 p 12] 9583

CSO: 3650/147

TURKEY

TPC LEADER INTERVIEWED ON HUMAN RIGHTS, KURDS

Paris HUMANITE DIMANCHE in French 24 Apr 87 p 15

[Interview with Haydar Kutlu, secretary-general of the Turkish Communist Party, by Dominique Bari, date and place not specified; first two paragraphs are HUMANITE DIMANCHE introduction]

[Text] On 12 September 1980, a military coup imposed a dictatorship in Turkey. Now, 7 years later, Ankara is seeking membership in the EEC while stating that "democratization" is underway in the country. France is supporting this step by the Turkish regime.

Haydar Kutlu, the secretary-general of the Turkish Communist Party, who has just visited France at the invitation of the French Communist Party, granted an exclusive interview to HUMANITE DIMANCHE. He confirmed for us that the night of the generals has not come to an end.

[HUMANITE DIMANCHE] Last week, Turkey officially presented its request to become a member of the EEC. To this end, the dictatorship which came out of the military coup claims that the country is evolving toward democracy. How far has it come in reality?

[Haydar Kutlu] This regime is still a dictatorship. Neither the current parliament, government, nor president was freely elected by the people. With a view toward joining the EEC, the general wanted to set up a parliamentary facade. Now, for the elections, the parties allowed to run have been chosen by the military (most political groups were outlawed after the coup d'etat-editor's note).

In that case, can one speak of democracy? The constitution of 1982 is seen by everyone as being antidemocratic. It perpetuates the generals' domination over the state. One of them, General Evren, the main instigator of the coup had himself "elected" president of the Republic. He holds inordinate power. And it is this man with the shady past who now tells us that there is democratization.

[HUMANITE DIMANCHE] Then fundamentally nothing has changed in the policy of the Turkish regime, particularly insofar as human rights are concerned?

[Haydar Kutlu] Nothing. Thousands of democrats are still being prosecuted in trials which have been going on for years--among them, members of the Association for Peace, and DISK trade union members. Some militants in our party and in other leftist organizations are imprisoned. Torture is still routinely practiced. People "disappear" while in police custody--250 such cases are known (the most numerous "disappearances" occur in the Kurdish regions). Some 419 people have died from physical torture, and 105 death penalties have been handed down for political crimes. The press and publishing companies remain under strict censorship. Books are seized--according to recent information, 39 tons of works have been destroyed since 1980.

[HUMANITE DIMANCHE] Little is said of the repression against the Kurds. It is nevertheless one of the bloodiest. What is going on in Turkey's Kurdistan?

[Haydar Kutlu] Ten million Kurds in Turkey are subjected to terrible repression in flagrant violation of the Charter of the Rights of Man. They are forbidden to speak their own language. And the very word "Kurd" is banned from the vocabulary. A large part of Kurdistan, the region running from Dyarbakyr to the Iraqi and Iranian borders, is completely isolated from the rest of the world by the military.

[HUMANITE DIMANCHE] In the area of struggle, is nothing happening?

[Haydar Kutlu] An important social movement is developing. The opposition is unprecedented since the coup d'etat. Strikes are breaking out in numerous industrial sectors and in the service industries. They are led with determination and some of them are meeting with success. The workers are demanding democracy and respect for trade union rights against a background of economic crisis: wide-spread unemployment, frozen salaries, and galloping inflation. A general strike forbidden by the constitution is even foreseen. The discontent is likewise spreading to the students, who have no say in selecting their curriculum when they enter the university. At the end of 1986, we witnessed a great mobilization of youth against the new law promulgated by the governing board of the universities.

[HUMANITE DIMANCHE] What is the audience of Turkey's Communist Party?

[Haydar Kutlu] Our party recently held its national conference in Turkey even with the participation of its secretary-general. So the communists are present and have preserved the bulk of their strength in spite of very harsh repression. The Turkish Communist Party has kept its influence among the workers, and has found a more receptive audience among young people and students whose current struggles we are supporting. We are working to get DISK officially recognized again, and, of course, we are clearly asking that our party be legalized. It has been outlawed for 66 years, and is the only communist party in Europe that is forced to operate underground.

9895/12951 CSO: 3519/120

### BRIEFS

BOFORS TRINITY SYSTEM ORDERED—Karlskoga (TT)—Bofors has received its first order for the new Trinity antiaircraft system, the marketing of which began in 1984. The West German Navy has bought parts of the system for modernizing its old Bofors antiaircraft guns. Bofors confirms that it has received the order, but for reasons of secrecy does not want to say how many guns or much money the deal involves. But the order will be mentioned in Nobel Industries' annual report, which will be published in May. In any case, the West German order involves replacement of the actual gun and magazine, not the purchase of complete systems. Critics in the peace movement and elsewhere claim that exporting the Trinity system conflicts with the principles governing Swedish arms exports and defense policy, since Trinity was developed specifically for export and not to meet the requirements of the Swedish Armed Forces. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 24 Apr 87 p 14] 11798

CSO: 3650/122

NORWAY

## CONCERN OVER FINNMARK VULNERABILITY AS USSR, U.S. BUILD FORCES

#### General Welcomes Aircraft Carriers

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 17 Mar 87 p 25

[Article by Vesa Santavuori: "Norway Wants Additional Aircraft Carriers in Coastal Waters"]

[Text] Oslo--"How often would I want NATO's aircraft carriers in Norway's coastal waters? A military exercise require's an approximately 25-day presence in a year," said Major General Gunnar Helseth to HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Kolsa in the vicinity of Oslo.


The goal seems absurd since in the last 10--12 years the average number of days that aircraft carriers have been present in Norwegian waters has been 4.5 days a year. This has already generated political arguments that in question is an indication of a U.S. intent to establish a permanent presence in the Norwegian Sea.

#### Military Wishful Thinking

Helseth does not really believe that a forceful increase of aircraft carrier tours of the area will occur in practice. "I doubt that any one nation is financially capable of this. Not even the United States. It has other concerns. Its presence can be found in the Mediterranean, the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean..."

Helseth's hope that there will be a forceful increase in visits by aircraft carriers is thus primarily military wishful thinking. It is his requirement estimate as a responsible planning officer.

Major General Gunnar Helseth is responsible for the long-term operational planning and reconnaissance of NATO's northern flank at the headquarters in Kolsa. As a man ready with words he snapped back with an answer to the accusation of a permanent presence for aircraft carriers by stating that it is most obviously an exaggeration. There remain 361 days in a year without any aircraft carriers in the vicinity of Norway, he calculates.



The USSR's major naval exercise in the summer of 1985 demonstrated that the USSR is capable of building submarine blockades rather quickly in northern sea areas. Their purpose is to prevent NATO's entry into the area.

# Key:

- 1. Submarine blockade
- 2. Aircraft carrier group
- 3. Reinforcements to Norway
- 4. Greenland

- 5. Iceland
- 6. Great Britain
- 7. Norway
- 8. Sweden
- 9. Finland

Getting aircraft carriers to conduct exercises in Norwegian waters is in any event a significant matter.

Just the appearance of one aircraft carrier group in the vicinity of Norway immediately raises the power of the area's air defense from the medium to

something worthy of note. The number of aircraft will increase manyfold and flight control, among other things, will be qualitatively improved.

On the other hand, it has been argued that bringing aircraft carriers too close to the Kola Peninsula would be too dangerous when one considers the vast resources of the USSR in the area.

According to General Helseth, it may, nevertheless, be that it is easier to defend aircraft carriers brought into Norway's fjords than sailing in the open sea.

A modern fighter-bomber is capable of launching missiles from quite a distance if the target is large and in the open sea. On the coast a destroyer aircraft "is not able to distinguish an aircraft carrier from an island", so that an enemy pilot must fly in closer. Then it will come within range of the aircraft carrier's defensive weapons "and becomes a dead aircraft", states Helseth by way of illustration.

Basic Traits of Sea Strategy

He clarifies the need for NATO's "boosted up" sea strategy by means of three basic points of view. From the point of view of the West, generally speaking, what is new in the situation is "how we perceive certain traits of the threat picture", says Helseth.

The first basic trait he mentions is the range of strategic nuclear missiles launched from nuclear submarines.

The Soviet Union's Typhoon and Delta-class ships are capable of firing anywhere they want from under the polar ice. There are always openings in the polar ice from where it is possible to fire missiles.

On the other hand, the vessels are well protected under the ice since it is not easy to monitor their movements by means of sonar observations inasmuch as the ice is always clattering and screeching.

Helseth mentions the present training models of the Soviet Navy as the second factor. They demonstrate that the Soviet Union is capable of building block-ades rather quickly in the Norwegian Sea and even all the way to the west side of the Shetland Islands.

The picture includes the fact that the Soviet Union has begun to deploy cruise missiles in its Yankee-class submarines. Former submarine obstacles are changing into submarine obstacles which support submarines equipped with cruise missiles. These also include surface ships which are supported by aircraft capable of being refueled in the air.

These obstacles can be put in place in approximately 5--7 days before NATO can get to the area. And it could take NATO weeks to eliminate the obstacles.

The third circumstance that is alarming from NATO's point of view is that vital shipments of reinforcements are also in danger -- approximately a thousand commercial shipments in a month from the United States and Canada to Europe during a crisis.

Taking all three of the above-mentioned points of view into consideration, NATO has a military need to bring units into the Norwegian Sea at an especially early stage already according to Helseth.

He makes reference to World War II. At that time, we saw the kind of damage 45 German submarines were able to inflict against convoys. The Soviet Union now has 180 submarines in the area of the Kola Peninsula, Helseth points out.

### Possible Attack Through Finland

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 18 Mar 87 p 27

[Article by Vesa Santavuori: "Norway Deliberates Finland's Defense Capability, It Is Believed USSR Considers Arm of Finland as Transit Area to Norway"]

[Text] Oslo--The arm of Finland is perceived in a military debate as a possible transit area, along which the movement of army units from the Kola Peninsula to Norway is an alternative worthy of consideration.

Officers responsible for the defense of Northern Norway quite frequently and vocally give consideration to whether such through passage is also possible in practice. Is Finland's military power sufficient to prevent a strike through the arm of Finland?

This is part of the normal peacetime military policy debate, which goes on in public in Norway with significantly more animation than in Finland. It is not a question of whether it is thought that the threat of a crisis has suddenly increased in the area. The argument that Sweden has invested sufficient resources in the north, but that Finland's capabilities are not sufficient even though the desire may be there has been especially prevalent in Norway.

The General's Ideas

The last time such ideas were presented was in January 1987 in the right-wing newspaper AFTENPOSTEN by Lieutenant General Viglief Eide, commander of the Northern Norway Military District.

Researcher Tomas Ries, who works in Norway's Foreign Policy Institute, somewhat surprisingly came to Finland's defense in this debate.

Ries attacked two of Lieutenant General Eide's basic arguments and attempted to demonstrate that they are already outdated and as such are untenable.

According to Eide, "it is considered that Sweden continues to be able to oppose an attack once its troops have been mobilized".

On the other hand, Eide's evaluation of Finland is that the number of troops in the north is "relatively few". "In spite of capable leaders and a will to fight, Northern Finland must be considered as a possible transit area, the arm of Finland included.

Finnmark's Roads Would Be Cut

The arm of Finland is aimed directly at the heart of Northern Norway's defense or the area of Tromso to Bodo.

Norway has left the defense of Finnmark at a relatively "light" level in peacetime.

In the event of a war it is considered that the military is capable of cutting Finnmark's road connections effectively and quickly. An actual defensive battle would be waged over the control of the Tromso-Bodo area.

The plan would be disrupted greatly if an invading force could enter the area "easily" through Finland.

"Everyone Would Have Same Number of Troops"

Researcher Tomas Ries is now attempting to pacify Lieutenant General Eide by quoting from public sources that Sweden, Finland as well as Norway, for the most part, have the same number of troops at their disposal in the north.

Ries presents detailed troop-unit figures and mobilization plans and in this way demonstrates that Finnish Lapland is not a military vacuum.

Ries does not dispute the fact that Northern Finland along with its arm is a possible transit area. On the other hand, he states that the possibility of the success of transiting this area "is not necessarily greater through Finland than Sweden". He presents numerous military-tactical circumstances as arguments.

Ries's study will soon be published in a local military periodical. Thus possible reactions to it can be expected for some time.

Sidelong Glances at Arm of Finland

Then why do Norway's officers cast suspicious glances in the direction of the arm of Finland with a persistent concern while conducting map exercises. The points of view presented by Ries must be known in the general staffs.

The "concern" may be a result of the fact that there is a desire to influence Finland. A certain amount of genuine uncertainty is always connected with power relationship calculations regarding combat situations.

"Finland may continue to have critically too few troops and equipment in Lapland," said a certain military man to HELSINGIN SANOMAT after glancing at Ries's study.

"And the fact that there would be a sufficient number of troops is an unconditional requirement for the assumption that Finland will remain outside of a conflict in the event of a war. Everything depends on what the military commander in the Leningrad area decides. If he thinks that transiting Lapland may be too costly, he will leave it alone. If not, he may make an attempt."

Divisions Like Wieners

The Norwegian officer was as interested in counting divisions as a banquet caterer is in counting wieners.

"Let us adopt the premise that the decision-maker in Leningrad has 15 divisions at his disposal.

"He will need two to protect Leningrad and two more to protect the Kola Peninsula. A lot of vital equipment is located there.

"Then he will need eight divisions to occupy the Tromso area.

"Two or three will be left. Is this sufficient to transit Lapland and maintain supply lines -- therein lies the question."

Weak Economy Complicates Security

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 25 Mar 87 p 23

[Article by Vesa Santavuori: "Migration from Finland to Finnmark Wanted"]

[Text] Vuoreija--The most northern municipalities of Norway have launched a forceful campaign to persuade residents in the south to move permanently to live on the coast of the Arctic Ocean.

Instead of complaining about the emigration, which has been considerable, they have begun to beat the drum for the idea that Finnmark is "a province of opportunities", Thor Robertson, vice-chairman of the Vuoreija Municipal Government and member of the provincial government, says enthusiastically to HEL-SINGIN UUTISET.

The invitation is also directed at Finns -- physicians and others trained in health care are especially welcome. And young women who come to work in the fish processing plants are valued especially if they remain in Finnmark permanently, marry, and bear children.

Investments from Finland in tourism, among other things, are also welcome. Finnmark has already become a favorite tourist area for Finns, and not without reason. The winter is mild, nature is splendid, and there are rivers other than the Teno replete with salmon.

#### Finland Has Reservations

The enthusiasm is so great that concern has been expressed in Helsinki. Finland and Norway "should make certain that an area's education of personnel be sufficient for the needs of the population so that they do not need to begin recruiting personnel from a neighboring country, in which there is also a shortage", states Risto Laakkonen, an official of the Finnish Labor Ministry, to HELSINGIN SANOMAT.

The Nordic countries have free and common labor markets so that obstacles to the migration of physicians cannot and should not be imposed. Finnish-speaking medical personnel is also needed in Norway's Finnish-speaking areas, says Laakkonen. He is proposing the "sale and purchase" of health care services across the border between border municipalities.

"Northern Norway now has an opportunity to avoid many of the mistakes Sweden made," thinks Laakkonen. Initially, Sweden thought it was obtaining a mere work force, but it gradually learned to observe that it had also received people who had innumerable needs for services."

#### Caught Fish Do No Accumulate

The most important trump card in the economic restoration of Finnmark is a strong faith in the province's most important livelihood or its fisheries. "The demand for fish is increasing in the wealthy world markets," assures Thor Robertson. "Surpluses will not occur in the same manner as in the production of butter and wine, for example, in the EC-countries," adds the FINNMARKEN newspaper in an outright rosy evaluation of the future.

The problem lies in the fact that present fishing equipment is dangerously efficient and expensive. It favors large businesses and discriminates against labor-intensive coastal fishing with little capital. With the new expensive technology it will be possible to overfish and deplete the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean unless conservation measures are carried out.

But attention is being given to such measures, and the imbalance of nature disclosed by the seal attacks will be corrected according to calculations in Vesisaari. There emphasis is being placed on the fact that cooperation in research work connected with the study of the stocks of fish is going exceptionally well with their most important neighbor or the Soviet Union.

The "only thing" is to draw the correct international and fishery policy conclusions from the study. Finnmark must develop a "flexible" fishing fleet, which is capable of harvesting the most suitable stocks of fish from the point of view of an ecological balance.

#### Oil, Kola Peninsula, and Generals

Reference is also made in Vesisaari to the fact that the Barents Sea basin is part of Finnmark's continental shelf. Norway's rights to the wealth of this sea is thus based in Finnmark.



# Key:

- 1. Svalbard (Spitsbergen)
- 2. Franz Josef Land
- 3. Novaya Zemlya
- 4. Barents Sea
- 5. Finnmark

- 6. Norway
- 7. Sweden
- 8. Finland
- 9. Pechenga
- 10. Kola Peninsula
- 11. USSR

The vast oil, gas, and mineral reserves of the Barents Sea will be exploited in the next few decades, which will attract large investors to the province. Before that, Finnmark must be developed to be so vital that it will be able to keep a permanent benefit for itself from the oil rush.

Finnmark's municipal officials have Oslo's generals as their support in these calculations. Finnmark is a strategically important area facing the Soviet Union on Norway's eastern border. Finnmark's population must not be allowed

to decrease any further -- otherwise Russians will replace them over the centuries, say the military men.

They cast glances of concern in the direction of the Kola Peninsula where the USSR has built military bases as support for approximately a million permanent residents. As a counterbalance to this, Norway's Finnmark must unconditionally entice additional residents even though it may be costly.

"Every wealthy society needs its elite," said a certain general in referring the province's population problems. He proposed lower taxation and better vacation benefits for those who move to Finnmark as an enticement.

The attempts by Finnmark to increase the population seemed to the people in the south at first glance to be impossible to accomplish. In the last 10 years approximately 10,000 people have left the area while the population of Finnmark is presently 75,000.

Those who have moved away have primarily been young families and unmarried women. This discloses the fact that opportunities to make a living in Finnmark are few. A livelihood must be found elsewhere.

"Living is expensive here. Food costs more than elsewhere in Norway and means of transport and communication are inconvenient. A trip to Oslo costs more money than a vacation trip to sun coasts of Southern Europe," said a young Norwegian girl in describing the situation in Kirkkoniemi.

She also complained about how shabby the construction is in Kirkkoniemi. "Nothing new has been put up here since World War II," she said.

#### Vesisaari Is Alive

Vesisaari, the capital city of Finnmark, on the other hand, seems to be a lively community. During the best shopping hours, the streets are teeming with people. People come to the center of town either by car, kick sled, or by walking. This in a city on the south side of which undulates the Arctic Ocean.

People stop to chat on the street -- because of the Gulf stream, the temperature is a little on the plus side -- and the people seem to be satisfied.

The open sea glistens blue and the snowy mountains along the shore of Varanger Fjord are dimly visible in the distance.

In the evening, the local restaurant offers live jazz music, which is enjoyed by a relatively large group of young adults.

The general type of housing is comprised of family homes, and the buildings are generally clean and well maintained. The center of town has a solarium and well-equipped bodybuilding club. "And it is almost impossible to find a lot for a summer cabin," sighs an individual on a brisk Saturday morning—the best time to be in a summer cabin—in the coffee shop of a Vesisaari hotel.

This argument seems strange since even though a lot of summer cabins can be seen on the side of the hills along Varanger Fjord, there is also still a lot of space. In any case, the conversation reveals the fact that there is also money in the area. The average price of a summer cabin is a 100,000 kroner.

10576

CSO: 3617/74

SWEDEN

NAVY PREPARING FOR START OF NEW 'SUBMARINE SEASON'

Coastal Corvette Commander Comments

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 26 Apr 87 p 8

[Article by Roger Magnergard]

[Text] "Those we are hunting are professionals. That's why we must become professionals," says Lennart Danielsson, commander and captain of the coastal corvette "Stockholm."

"But we do not believe the intruders are here during the winter."

Danielsson, with a skipper's beard and clever blue eyes, ought to know, as he stands there looking out over still ice-covered archipelago waters. The submarine violations have been everyday business for him since the Uto incident in 1980.

First he was at Naval Base East, then part of the leadership of Karlskrona during the U 137 [incident], then 2 years with material development at the Naval Staff, when the submarine force was built up. In 1985-86 he headed a part of the submarine force, and since December of last year he has been captain of the "Stockholm."

The Key to Success

The coastal corvettes, 50 meters long and 7.5 meters wide, are the key to success. As sea, where previously helicopters could stay for 2 hours and chase the mother submarine, the corvettes can lie for several days. Where the "Stockholm" and its sister ship "Malmo" are operating, no submarine can move without being detected. The intruder is forced to lie still on the bottom or choose another area.

And choosing another area could become difficult for the submarine captain who has a schedule for docking with minisubs.

Danielsson emphasizes that the coastal corvettes are the Navy's equivalent of the JAS [Figher-Strike-Reconnaissance aircraft]. It is a complete tactical system with submarine capacity, equipped with missiles and torpedoes and a double fire control system, and the corvettes are able to lay mines.

## Needs Luck

To the question of whether the submarine hunting has been good this year, Danielsson replies evasively.

"We must be lucky, at the same time as he is unlucky."

"The intruder knows how to use his systems, and we must utilize the advantages we have."

One of the major problems for the submarine hunters is the Swedish system of working, with a regulated 40-hour work week. Working time must be regulated by the hour, 2 weeks ahead.

Furthermore, there are, in Danielsson's opinion, too few ships to put really good pressure on the intruders.

"Today we have an antisubmarine force which can operate in one area. But we know that the intruder undertakes coordinated operation against us--in several places, simultaneously."

"In order for us to be a deterrent, we must be able to be in several places at the same time."

As many other naval officers, Lennart Danielsson is disappointed in the defense agreement. The disappointment is aimed at the fact that the policitians "do not seem to take the submarine threat seriously."

"I had expected that a second ASW force should be established. Who knows what the situation will be in 1992?"

#### Too Little Evidence

Lennart Danielsson is afraid that the Navy has sounded the alarm about intruding submarines too many times without being able to show any evidence. A large part of the Swedish people now believe that the submarine violations are invented. Others believe in them, but have gotten used to them and merely shrug their shoulders.

"Cynically reasoned, maybe Swedish blood must flow in order for politicians and the general public to understand that it is serious."

The fact that in a tight situation a foreign submarine may defend itself and perhaps open fire on a Swedish ship is something the ASW people are reckoning with.

While hunting in Vidingefjarden last summer the "Malmo" and "Stockholm" had brief contact with a mother sub. The corvettes were then operating in the Aland Sea and were able to follow the sub for several minutes on its way out of Swedish territory.

There are no signs indicating that the violations are ceasing. Danielsson has a firm opinion of who the intruder is, "but to us military people that is insignificant—the nationality question is for the politicians."

# Intending to Neutralize

"The violations are a link in an operational preparation for war," in Danielsson's opinion. Not in order to invade Sweden, but to neutralize us in a civilian as well as military way if it comes to a conflict between the superpowers."

There is a desire, a little of the "let's show them" spirit on board the "Stockholm." Sure, the conscripts think they get much too little sleep and, sure, 32 men who live so close to one another get on each other's nerves sometimes.

"But this is serious business," says one of the lookouts in the dark of night as he stands looking out toward the edge of the ice outside the Alma reef.
"If we are not good enough we are sent away, but everyone wants to stay."

"This is where we can do something important."

On Friday the "Stockholm" and "Malmo" put into Stockholm. The coastal corvettes are tied up at the Nybro pier until Monday. However, there is no way to arrange open house for the public.

# ASW Training Officer Comments

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 4 May 87 p 7

[Article by Eric Dyring]

[Text] The great silence of the depths of the sea is a myth. The headphones of the submarine hunter are filled with a multitude of noise. There is a cacophony of sounds from rain, animal life, pleasure boats, whirling propellers, swimmers, rolling waves, seismic activity and many other things.

It is in this chaos of sound that the sound of a foreign submarine must be perceived. This is difficult, since submarines sneak about in silence in the lower waters. Furthermore, they are good at deception.

Sound functions in water as light and electromagnetic radiation in the air. The sound waves are good carriers of information in the lower waters.

There are two ways to use sound under water. One is to "irradiate with sound" what is to be studied, somewhat like shining a flashlight or letting the radar make an image by means of microwaves. Echoes bouncing from the sound into the environment are captured. It is possible to sound out detailed images of fish, wrecks, bottom topography and submarines.

This is an active technique. Helicopters use it for ASW when they lower their sound systems into the water. It is also used by surface ships and at the fixed listening stations on the coasts.

The other technique is passive. It listens and does not itself send out sounds. This is the reconnaissance technique of the submarines. Silently they glide around in the depths of the seas and listen with all their ears cocked. They do everything in order not to be discovered. The passive technique is also used in the Navy's listening buoys.

#### Musical Ear

What is required of a good sonar operator—the Navy's listening reconnaissance ears below the surface of the water? A sound interest beyond the usual? Musical ear and perfect pitch?

"That was what we thought before," says Navy Captain Gunnar Hagstrom.

He is chief of underwater training at Berga Naval Schools at Harsfjarden south of Stockholm.

Studies in the United States, which were repeated in Sweden, show that a good submarine hunter need not at all be a sound and music whiz.

"Good hearing is of course a requirement, but more important are endurance, concentration capability, and being equipped with a lot of imagination and feeling," Gunnar Hagstrom says.


He says that an operator must sit in total concentration during his shift as a listener. In a constant jumble of underwater sounds a different sound may suddenly appear for a fraction of a second. A dropped screwdriver inside the foreign submarine, a reckless rudder flip or rythmic whirring from a silent submarine propeller are the starting signal for the submarine hunt. While it is underway there is no time for coffee breaks.

#### Total Concentration

"Sitting at the sonar is sitting in total concentration for hours," says Gunnar Hagstrom. "It murmurs uniformly day and night. When something happens is is necessary to be alert. It requires enduring concentration."

Why are imagination and feeling necessary?

Sound in water is like light in air, and there are two ways to use sound under water, passive and active techniques.



- Key: 1. Passive technique
  - Active technique
  - With supersensitive microphones--"ears"--subs and buoys listen to the acoustical environment under water in their hunt for foreign submarines.
  - Sound is sent out and its echo produces images of the surroundings. The technique is used by surface ships and fixed facilities.

"Submarine captains are experienced and clever. They know all the tricks in the underwater game. Submarine hunting is a cat-and-mouse-game. It is an intellectual duel with the aid of the latest technology. Imagination is necessary to discern the opponent's future moves."

Sonar reconnaissance under water today means heaps of advanced technologyelectronics and computers. At the end of a long chain of technology sits the operator. His task is to adapt to the technology but still think independently. It is a difficult man-machine problem.

Underwater technology is in the midst of furious development. Both defender and attacker must have the very latest thing in order to keep up. And the

apparatus becomes more expensive with each new generation. No wonder Sweden's supreme commander and the politicians are making faces.

ASW is difficult. In the Baltic it is very difficult. When the superpowers play tag in the depths of the big oceans they have several kilometers between the surface and the bottom at their disposal. In the Baltic Sea the average depth is only 50 meters. The bottom topography plays unpleasant tricks. Reality does not fit into the theoretical models. Furthermore, the water in the Baltic is layered in different thermal and saline layers. There are ample opportunities for a submarine to hide down in the depths of the Baltic.

Does modern sonar reconnaissance require super geniuses, then?

No, say people at Berga. But it does require professionals.

Superprofessionals

The Navy's sonar training is tough. The passive technique, above all, requires superprofessionals, usually permanently employed.

"Training an operator for passive technique is like training a concert pianist," says Gunnar Hagstrom. "Extensive daily training is needed and a feeling for technology and duty which can only be reached through years of experience."

An acoustic system for underwater reconnaissance involves an extensive package of electronics and computers that is difficult to grasp. It is capable of catching even the weakest sound. It handles, processes, analyzes, stores and presents the gathered information. At the very end of the technical chain is the operator. He is chained to the technology, but must use his human capability. It is important to be able to trust the equipment, interpret the messages rapidly, decide to act and give the orders to the weapon systems.

What is it like to be a passive sonar operator? DAGENS NYHETER is asking Captain Magnus Sjolund. He is normally to be found on the submarine "Sjohasten," but has been forced up on land by the winter ice.

"The new digital technology makes us tremendously stressed. We have difficulty keeping up. The information washes over you. There is a mixture of sounds telling us about speeds and directions. Reconnaissance, analysis and fire control take place in a continuous system. The decisions must be made correctly and rapidly. The moment of truth comes when the torpedo is to be fired. The nagging throught grabs you—did I do the right thing?"

Acoustic technology changes generation every decade.

"The 1960's was the decade of analog technology," says Magnus Sjolund. "We turned knobs. In the 1970's the analog technology was mixed with digital. Now in the 1980's we just push buttons. Digital has taken over."

At the submarine school the equipment stands there on a historical parade. Right now, training takes place with the most recent system intended for the new submarine "Vastergotland," launched in December. Reconnaissance, analysis and fire control are coordinated by means of computer via two screens.

#### For Miles

The system contains acoustic signatures for our own and other submarines and much else. This archive of sound is supersecret. It is constantly renewed and replenished. Suspicious sounds can be directly compared to archive sounds. The class of a submarine can be determined. Even a certain submarine can be detected. The computer still takes care of the first sorting. The sonar operator's sound archive in his brain is yet more important. It is there that decisions are made. However, the development is heading toward giving the computers increasingly advanced tasks.

Magnus Sjolund tells us that the normal inhabitants of the sea are loudly heard in the sound systems. Whales can be heard for miles when they talk to each other. Certain species of shrimp are tremendously chatty. Porpoises that take a liking to a sub and keep it company can block the sound system of the submarine.

The submarine violations have resulted in Sweden's emphasis on underwater technology. The Navy is now taking the acoustical route. Training in acoustic technology is growing rapidly at Berga. Everyone gets 30 hours of basic acoustic training. To this is added the specialist training. Even women are included. Right now three are taking a cadet course in ASW.

"Most are capable of working with sound," says Captain Curt Kornefalk, head of the acoustic training at Berga. In order to become an acoustic professional, however, something extra is needed—an inborn sense of rythm and time.

11949 CSO: 3650/135 SWEDEN

#### EXTREMELY SENSITIVE HYDROPHONE TO BE USED IN SUB HUNTING

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 15 Apr 87 p 6

[Article by Roger Magnergard]

[Text] The Navy is going to get a new type of active seabed hydrophone in 1988. It will be so sensitive that it will be able to detect a foreign diver.

"From a distance of 1 kilometer, it will be able to pick up the sound of any unfamiliar object moving through the water--everything from frogmen to submarines," says Agneta Welander of the Defense Materiel Administration (FMV).

Four different companies are working to produce prototypes for the FMV--one in California, one in Canada, one in Scotland, and Sweden's Saab Combitech, which is cooperating with Norway's Simrad.

Transmits Sound Signals

The hydrophone, which is active—meaning that it transmits sound signals—is linked to a computer into which the seabed topography has been preprogrammed.

This means is that the hydrophone can screen out all unimportant information such as the echo from hills, wrecks, and other irregularities on the sea floor which usually cause such headaches for submarine chasers.

The sound signals are converted into a TV picture, making the hydrophone signals even easier to monitor.

Not yet Tested

The FMV has not yet decided which firm will get the order, since the hydrophones have not yet been fully tested. But according to Agneta Welander, the first units will be purchased as early as next year.

She says: "They will be set in place as fast as they are delivered. To begin with, they will be concentrated in places that are particularly important, examples being Karlskrona, Musk Island, and Hars Bay."

The cost of each hydrophone is estimated at about 800,000 kronor. To protect all the entrances to the Karlskrona Basin, 12 hydrophones will be needed at a cost of 9.6 million kronor.

Useful System

"This is a system which, together with others, may turn out to be extremely useful in guarding sea approaches," says Commander Anders Timdahl of the Navy Staff's Information Department.

According to Timdahl, these hydrophones will have to be supplemented with passive hydrophones and magnetic coils.

"When we get readings corresponding in time from all the instruments, we can be sure that an intruder is moving about in our waters."

11798

CSO: 3650/129

SWEDEN

GOTLAND RECEIVING NEW EMPHASIS AS ASW, INVASION DEFENSE KEY

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 9 May 87 p 7

[Article by Anders Ohman: "Gotland Can Protect All of the Baltic"]

[Text] Farosund—Gotland's importance for the Swedish defense is increasing. A heavy coastal battery with firing ranges in excess of 100 kilometers is being considered for the island. The ASW capability is reinforced through permanently manned mine stations and sonar-equipped patrol boats.

"Gotland is needed for Sweden--a reinforcement of the island's defense is both cost-effective and necessary in order to raise the peace-keeping effect of the defense," says Hakan Soderlindh, colonel and head of Gotland's Coast Artillery defense,  $GK/KA\ 3$  at Farosund.

In the future defense decision, 200 million were set aside for four heavy coastal missile batteries over the next 5 years up to 1992. They are to be manufactured by Saab Bofors and are of type RBS 15, already operational as anti-ship missiles on missile boats of the coastal fleet. Range is over 100 kilometers.

The Defense Committee that dealt with the defense bill visited Gotland in August last year. The island's significance for the Swedish defense is growing, particularly so as an intelligence platform in the early warning system, according to which the Swedish defense has been organized. An attacker's preparations for war are to be discovered at such an early stage that the defense can be mobilized.

Around the Clock

Preparedness on Gotland is high today. Radar stations and other units monitor their vicinity around the clock. The squadrons of JA 37 Viggens which are responsible for the high degree of incident preparedness take off from and land at Visby airport.

The fact that one of the four heavy coastal missile batteries is being placed on Gotland is a sensible, logical and cost-effectively reasonable decision,

according to Col Hakan Soderlindh. Several coastal batteries on Gotland can cover the entire Swedish portion of the Baltic from the Stockholm region east to Gotland and down to Blekinge (see figure).

Mobile coastal missile units are difficult to detect. They can be transported and fired from ordinary trucks, which are easy to conceal in barns and forest areas. The units can maintain high preparedness and be redeployed rapidly. Hakan Soderlindh, who has pleaded for coastal missiles in the local press, is convinced of the deterrent effect of this weapon.

"If a foreign power knows that we have this weapon, there is very little likelihood of his violating Swedish neutrality," he says.

'Model Units'

DAGENS NYHETER visited GK/KA 3 at Farosund on a cold spring day with fresh northerly winds. The unit spends about 95 million kronor and trains 400 conscripts with about 60 officers. It is the largest training battalion in the Coast Artillery. A model unit, sources at the Defense Staff say.

While waiting for heavy coastal missiles, GK/KA 3 is fine-tuning its preparedness. Emphasis is placed on foreign underwater activity. Minelaying troops and sonar-equipped patrol boats are two principal components of Gotland's ASW activity.

A well-equipped, modern Navy shipyard is located in connection with Farosund's Coast Artillery unit. Asbestos cleanup and renovation of older Coast Artillery boats from the 1960's is undertaken there. A large boat, which is to become part of a future amphibious battalion for the defense of the archipelago, is part of the program. Other shipyards are competing. About 60 men are employed at the shipyard, which means a great deal for Gotland. There is a shortage of jobs. GK/KA 3 is one of the island's largest employers.


A number of 70-boats are being refitted with new engines and supplied with new sonars. They are to be part of the new ASW activity.

Mine stations responsible for fixed bottom mines are part of the ASW defense of the Coast Artillery. In the Harsfjarden incident in 1982 a number of bottom mines were exploded against a foreign submarine. The Sundsvall incident about a year later was triggered by an indication from a mine station.

DAGENS NYHETER has been allowed to make a rare visit to a mine station on Gotland. Such stations are located along the 2,700 kilometer-long Swedish coast at important channels, key passages and harbor inlets.

The submarine incidents have increased preparedness in these mine stations. A number of bottom mines containing 300 kilograms of TNT each are laid in a particular pattern. The mines are regularly checked and can be detonated at any time from the station.

### Coastal Missile R15



The new coastal missile batteries will cover essentially the entire Swedish portion of the Baltic Sea.

- Key: 1. Speed: 1,000 km/hr; 4.35 m long, 770 kg.
  - 2. Will be used against invading naval forces. Launched from truck, boat or aircraft. Target-seeking. Manufactured by Saab and Bofors.
  - 3. Rises high after launch.
  - 4. Drops down toward the target to avoid detection.
  - 5. Missile can be redeployed rapidly.
  - 6. Radius: 100 kilometers.

An order for new fighter planes must be placed 5 years before delivery begins. This means that our Air Force and our political decisionmakers will be facing some tough questions at the start of the 1990's.

The commander of the Satakunda Wing, Colonel Jouko Knuuttila, says that we have been able to handle our missions using Drakens and have therefore been able to skip the Viggen. Doing so has saved Finland a great deal of money.

He hopes that the next generation of fighter planes will be as modern as possible so that they will stay in service a long time. According to him, Finland cannot skimp on quality either. If there is to be any skimping, it will have to be in the number of aircraft. But that number is already down to the minimum level.

11798

SWEDEN

# REPORTER ACCOMPANIES PLATOON ON NEW SOLDIER'S TEST

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 4 May 87 p 17

[Article by Anders Ohman: "The Soldier's Test Became a Sunday Stroll"]

[Text] "Well, well, captain, eating ice cream in the car ...."

Captain Rolf Olsson, platoon leader at Svea Life Guards, I 1, at Kungsangen, was the object of some teasing the other night. While he himself sat comfortably in the driver's seat of a terrain vehicle, his platoon of antitank defense soldiers, about 50 conscripts, was taking the soldier's test.

For over 7 hours at night the platoon marched 30 kilometers on asphalt with brief rest stops. Each soldier carried about 10 kilograms plus his weapons. The 30-kilometer march concluded with a shooting test at the shooting range.

That the platoon leader himself did not provide a good example and take the soldier's test was because he easily gets blisters under his feet.

"I usually do this march once a year, that's enough," says Rolf Olsson, who took the teasing with equanimity.

DAGENS NYHETER followed the soldiers during the long march. It began at midnight. The platoon had been sleeping soundly for about half an hour.

Then they were awakened by their platoon leader. Formation was ordered in the corridor.

Lieutenant Colonel Henrik von Vegesack, battalion chief, issued information about the night's exercise, a 30-kilometer march starting at Bromma Airport and finishing at Kungsangen. There was some clearing of throats and sighing. Then followed instructions in how to tape feet.

Walking on asphalt poses great demands on the feet. The toes, sole of the foot and heel become very warm. Wear on the boot can cause blister formation. The soldier's test could then become a painful nightmare. By taping toes, heel and protruding callouses one avoids blister formation.

DAGENS NYHETER's special correspondent took a foot bath, filed his callouses, rubbed in the defense forces' skin cream and taped with Leukoplast, the mountain walker's best friend. That lasted for the entire soldier's test.

Around half past one in the morning, the platoon got off the military bus at Bromma Airport and the 30-kilometer march began. Every trip begins with a single step. It felt long.

# The Spark Governs

All conscripts who are to get a commission after completed training must complete the soldier's test. The purpose is to be able to move on foot for 30 kilometers and then perform a minor combat duty.

The spark, the motivation, is what governs the platoon during the test. The march takes place in groups, where the stronger ones help the weaker ones.

DAGENS NYHETER got a taste of the Army's new leadership, the new orientation aimed at motivating the soldier rather than pressing him down into his boots.

When this correspondent did his military service in Karlskrona in the early 1960's, exercises in close combat were led by a nasty devil of a corporal from Gotland, who yelled incessantly.

During the night's soldier test DAGENS NYHETER was accompanied by a friendly, happy second lieutenant, who made this 46-year-old reporter with sailor's legs feel like someone out for a Sunday stroll on Djurgarden.

"Soon we will reach a curve, and after 100 meters a fluid check," said Claes Ivgren, second lieutenant at I l, just when the legs started to get numb.

### Four Liters

Then spirits returned quickly. The soldier's test requires a constant input of fluids. A soldier normally uses more than 4 liters of fluids, according the calculations by the Defense Research Institute. If the loss of fluids is not compensated for, cramps may occur, the fingers become wrinkled and the mood deteriorates. Boxes of raisins and chocolate bars were also distributed.

The raisins got the stomachs going. The smell of soldier farts was heavy over Bromma, Sundbyberg and Jarfalla this night.

DAGENS NYHETER's cheering section, 2d Lt Claes Ivgren, 21 years of age, talked about his life as a soldier. He became a Lapland commando at I 22 in Kiruna. During a mountain march in the Kebnekaise range he contracted a glandular fever and was forced to give up.

"When we got to the southern tip of Kebnekaise with arms and equipment, we met a girl in a white bikini who asked what we were doing there. I was totally finished; it was like a dream." Then came reserve officers school in Halmstad. His leisure time activities are hunting and physical training. He had a girl, but just ended the affair.

Military life poses major demands on relationships.

# A Weak Point

Now he is aiming for a civilian career. After completed service there will be business school for an MBA. These young Army officers are tremendously goal oriented, speak about defining the task, taking care of the soldiers, delegating responsibility. Rarely do they talk about giving orders.

"My weakest point is that I am not sufficiently humble," says Claes Ivgren.

Dawn comes and the sun appears when the platoon nears the Staket bridge. Breakfast is waiting on a hillside. Hot chocolate made with water, sandwiches. The carbohydrates give the body a shock. The last 10 kilometers are purely will power. Everyone keeps up with the platoon. Some are staggering. Their buddies take their kit and and weapons. The group leaders of the platoon are responsible. The officers are lying low. In a war the platoon's chances for survival depend on how they are able to function together. The group leader has a key role in coordinating, commanding, encouraging and urging his comrades on. The officers describe the duty.

Military polish isn't taken all that seriously. Several soldiers march with walkabout earphones. "I'm listening to "Foreigner," says an anonymous soldier.

After almost precisely 7 hours' march, DAGENS NYHETER passes the gates of Svea Life Guards and continues to the shooting range. There, five shots are to be fired with an automatic pistol against three standing cardboard figures. Shooting time 5 seconds. DAGENS NYHETER hits with the first shots standing, misses two shots, 12 minutes added to the time. Final time 7 hours, 12 minutes, soldier's test passed. The proof—a small button.

In small groups the platoon dribbles in to shoot. Everyone has completed the course. Maximum marching time 8 hours 30 minutes for 30 kilometers, in order to get the button 1 hour sooner [sic].

There is almost a demobilization mood over the platoon. Conscript Pillola staggers around in white socks with a smile. Second Lieutenant Christer Olsson distributes the soldier's test buttons. Several have sore feet, but no one complains.

"I am very satisfied with the boys," says platoon leader Rolf Olsson, who just laughs when someone says "you just run around and eat ice cream."

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SWEDEN

### BRIEFS

BEEFED-UP ASW EFFORT IN NORRLAND---Harnosand (TT)--By as early as next year, naval incident preparedness along the 600-mile-long Norrland coast may be a great deal better than it is today. The TT [PRESS WIRE SERVICE, INC.] has learned that Bengt Gustafsson, supreme commander of the Armed Forces, is determined to work toward getting the Navy's current resources redistributed in favor of the long and practically unguarded Norrland coast. One unit with four patrol boats or picket boats will be transferred to Harnosand, which will also get a reinforced naval patrol center. The Norrland coast will also be provided with passive sonobuoys that can monitor underwater activity. Navy currently has only one patrol boat available for incident preparedness along the entire lengthy stretch of coast between Gavle Bay and the Haparanda Patrol Boat 76 has become nationally famous for always arriving too late in response to the many submarine incidents that have occurred along the Norrland coast over the past few summers. [Text] [Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 29 Apr 87 p 22] 11798

DOMESTIC TANK DEVELOPMENT DOUBTED--(TT)--A new Swedish tank would cost an exorbitant amount if we produced it ourselves. So said Bengt Gustafsson, supreme commander of the Armed Forces, during an interview at the Malmo Stock Exchange on Wednesday. Gustafsson felt that any new type of tank should be looked for abroad, and he mentioned the West German Leopard tank as one possibility. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 Apr 87 p 12] 11798

HELLFIRE COASTAL DEFENSE MISSILE—The navy is going to get its Hellfire light coastal defense missile by 1990. It is to be included in the weaponry of the Archipelago Forces' new amphibious battalion. The Defense Materiel Agency (FMV) on Friday [12 June] signed an order worth 400 million kronor with the Rockwell International Corporation of the United States. The contract provides for series production of a new light missile system, which will be designated Robot 17. Final assembly of the missiles will take place in Sweden at Bofors Forsvarsmateriel. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 13 June 87 p 6] /12232

DENMARK

### COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS AGAINST EASY SOLUTIONS

Government Caused Overheated Economy

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 May 87 p 1

[Article by Hugo Garden: "The Bill for Growth Now Has to Be Paid"]

[Text] It is a reflection of escapism if politicians and the industrial sector want to solve the economic problems by way of quick measures, for example, by way of a devaluation, the Independent Council of Economic Advisers states.

"The Danes have to pay the bill for the far too high growth rate of recent years.

There is no place where the bill may be sent. The tight economic policy—without any relaxations of the fiscal policy or a devaluation—must now be adhered to in order to give credibility to the economic development," Professor Christen Sørensen, chief of the Independent Council of Economic Advisers, said yesterday following the meeting of the Independent Council of Economic Advisers. His statement corresponds to the evaluation made by Central Bank Director Erik Hoffmeyer in BERLINGSKE SØNDAG.

In a meeting with the press, the Independent Council of Economic Advisers clearly rejected the idea of a devaluation. For a depreciation of the krone will not solve the fundamental economic problems of unemployment and balance of payments disequilibrium, the Independent Council of Economic Advisers said.

If the Independent Council of Economic Advisers does not recommend a devaluation, it is associated with the fact that they do not believe that the Folketing will be able to carry through a consequent legislation that will be tight enough to outweigh the negative effects of a devaluation. There are no easy solutions.

Christen Sørensen responded to all those who "complain."

"The Independent Council of Economic Advisers has for many years advocated an economic policy that may improve the balance of payments problems. Throughout

the last year we warned against the downward trend, pointing out that the domestic demand--for example, the rates of consumption and building activity--was too large. Nobody listened. There was a false sense of optimism," Christen Sørensen said.

He has no sympathy for the business leaders who want a devaluation in order to make export goods less expensive. "Many business leaders have not believed in the government's firm and persistent policy. Many apparently believe that they were able to afford big wage increases, for the government will subsequently help them by way of a devaluation. But if they have not believed statements of a fixed krone rate, they have got to take the consequences," said Christen Sørensen.

At the meeting, several members of the Independent Council of Economic Advisers said that the Independent Council of Economic Advisers took a too pessimistic view of the economic downturn. The Independent Council of Economic Advisers expects a decline in the growth rate, an unemployment rate of 310,000 next year, but a balance of payments deficit of only 8-9 billion kroner.

# Paper Comments on Report

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 May 87 p 10

[Editorial: "The Independent Council of Economic Advisers and the Business Sector"]

[Text] Things have not become any easier for an ambitious minister of industry following the meeting yesterday of the Independent Council of Economic Advisers. For the essence of the comprehensive analysis by the Independent Council of Economic Advisers of the industrial policy was that the said policy, at the most, may be a second best contribution in the efforts to solve the country's large economic balance of payments problems. Elsewhere, the report states in even less friendly terms that the contribution of the industrial policy to the solution of the problems will be so limited as to make it entirely unrealistic to rely solely on such a policy.

It is probably good that this is being said, although the government quite agrees with the Independent Council of Economic Advisers. The government only intends the business policy as the supplement it may provide to the general policy, determining the basic conditions of the various industries and thus their ability to compete, thus the interest and exchange rates, taxes and wages.

Nevertheless, ideas of a purposeful industrial policy abound in the political landscape, and the views of the Social Democratic Party are more heated than ever. It therefore is a good thing that the Independent Council of Economic Advisers kill the firm belief in stakes on "the winners of the future" and also point to all of the other restrictions or unfortunate consequences of subsidies which are more or less selective. It is actually a question whether the business sector itself ought not to take a firmer stand. For

what is the use of an export subsidy from the state which constitutes between 1 and 2 per thousand of the enterprises' own costs in connection with their export sales?

One thing is certain, however, namely that, at best, the industrial subsidy policy measures take longer to take effect than the acute balance of payments problems of the country can wait for. This applies, in particular, to the research area. Nevertheless, the Independent Council of Economic Advisers—and, for that matter, also the budget reports of the government—from a long-term point of view, may be concerned that the industrial research efforts are too small. How may this problem be tackled by means of state funds, which in any circumstances will only be a trickle?

A comparison of enterprises within the same trade and of the same size will show that Danish industry from the point of view of research easily comes up to the standards of foreign research efforts. But it makes a difference that the state subsidy comes like a shower on top of the defense industries of foreign countries. Another and decisive difference is that Denmark has strikingly few very large enterprises to carry the big load of research.

The growth of large enterprises requires that one accepts big earnings. But decades of Danish politics have taken a negative view of this. The laws of the distribution policy affect the country and have even affected the enterprices with major wage increases. But the Independent Council of Economic Advisers does not state such things directly.

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SWEDEN ECONOMIC

PANEL OF EXPERTS TO STUDY ALTERNATIVES TO NUCLEAR POWER

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 14 May 87 p 12

[Article by Ake Ekdahl: "Study of Alternative to Nuclear Power"]

[Text] Energy Minister Birgitta Dahl will soon appoint a new committee to study energy supply when nuclear power will no longer be used. This will be a panel of experts headed by Undersecretary Rolf Annerberg of the Ministry of Energy and Environment.

This is the only concrete new feature in the principal proposition the government will submit to the Riksdag on Thursday, May 21, at the latest. Dahl invites representatives for the energy industry to join the panel. A report will be submitted by the end of the year so that the government will be able to present its detailed proposition on how the use of nuclear power will be abolished in the spring of 1988.

The panel is to study how new energy, new energy sources and the distribution of electric power will have to be developed to replace the loss of energy caused by the closing of the nuclear power plants. It is estimated that the first plant could close sometime in 1993-95 and the second 1994-96.

The minister of energy presupposes that the replacement energy will be domestic and environmentally acceptable. This requirement, strictly speaking, can, however, only be met by using hydro electric power and the government would like to develop one of the four large protected rivers, for example, Kalix.

### Natural Gas

However, the principle proposition does not indicate either which nuclear power plants should close first nor does it indicate which energy sources can replace them.

With regard to imported energy, the natural gas from the Atlantic Ocean via Denmark and Norway is the most realistic. The gas network is being developed on the west coast and it can be extended to the Malardalen. Coal is an option with the new refining methods that now will be tested in Vartan. But the use of coal does, however, make Sweden undesirably dependent on imports.

### Abolishment Causes Concern

The government sticks firmly to the compromise which the Social Democratic Party leadership agreed to. Dahl implies that a permanent energy supply can be guaranteed as replacement before the nuclear power is prematurely abolished.

The concern about increased price of electric power and employment both at the nuclear power plants and in energy demanding industry, within the lumber industry, steel industry and paper industry, was reflected at the meeting of the Social Democratic Party Riksdag's Group when Dahl presented the principles for the closing of the nuclear power plants. Ten speakers took the floor; none pleaded for prompt closing.

The plan for increased energy conservation which the government wants to implement can mean concern for both industry and households with regard to economy and the supply of electric power, according to many social democrats.

Even the security issues at the nuclear plants are being discussed, as flight of personnel is feared as soon as the government and the Riksdag report which nuclear plants will be closed first.

# Difficult to Replace

One of the people who has been interested in the employment issue at the nuclear plants is Birger Rosquist, member of the Riksdag from Oskarshamn. The three plants in Oskarsham employ 850 people, many of whom who are professionals and it will be difficult to replace them if they leave the plant prematurely.

"It is not enough to refer to Uddevalla as an example of the government's responsibility for employment in the plants in question. The Ullevalla plant manufactured tankers that are not in demand and it cost the government huge amounts of money. The nuclear power plants produce a product that is in demand which is of value for the country," he told DAGENS NYHETER.

"It will be difficult to convince the personnel at the plants that this product is not needed," says Rosquist.

A government proposal on May 21, at the latest, means that the Riksdag will have the possibility to make a motion on the nuclear power before the summer break. However, a decision on the principles for an earlier abolishment of nuclear power cannot be made in the Riksdag until this fall.

SWEDEN ECONOMIC

STRONG DECLINE REGISTERED IN IMPORTS FROM SOUTH AFRICA

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 23 Apr 87 p 16

[Article by Annika Ortmark]

[Text] Merchandise imports from South Africa have declined sharply. In January 1987, Swedish imports totaled only a scant 6 million kronor. We buy chiefly metals, but even those imports have declined over the past year.

This is revealed by new figures from the Central Bureau of Statistics (SCB). Sven-Erik Casselmark of the SCB points out, however, that one cannot draw definite conclusions for the rest of the year based on that. Imports vary from month to month. But there are signs—in the statistics, for example—that the firms are already preparing for the consequences of the impending trade boycott of South Africa.

In January of this year, Sweden imported 5.8 million kronor worth of goods from South Africa, with iron and steel accounting for 1.3 million kronor and other metals accounting for twice that. In January 1986, our imports were up to just over 21 million kronor. Iron and steel imports totaled just under 9 million kronor, and other metals accounted for just under 8 million kronor.

Sven-Erik Casselmark says: "Our imports are really insignificant now."

A comparison between the 2 most recent years makes the difference even more striking: in 1985, our imports from South Africa totaled 412 million kronor. Last year, they dropped by two-thirds to 146 million kronor (see the table).

No Food Products

Food imports stopped completely in 1986, and Sweden no longer imports either fruits or vegetables. Instead, we have increased our fruit imports from Chile and other places.

We import mainly metals, machinery, and chemicals from South Africa.

Hans von Delwig of the Ironmasters Association in Stockholm emphasizes our need for ferromanganese, which is used in all steel production.

"In one way or another, it comes from South Africa because that country accounts for 40 percent of the world's production," he says.

Norway produces ferromanganese, and Sweden, in turn, buys most of what it consumes from Norway. Chrome ore is another important alloying metal imported by Sweden. Sweden produces its own ferrochromium, which is used in the production of ball bearing steel, among other things.

Sweden buys part of its chrome ore from Finland, Turkey, and Greece, but those suppliers are small compared to South Africa. The Ironmasters Association says that 95 percent of the world's supply of ore used in alloys (chrome, manganese, and so on) is concentrated in South Africa and Zimbabwe. Von Delwig believes that Sweden has replaced part of its imports from South Africa with imports from Norway.

DAGENS NYHETER telephoned around to firms that are dependent on metals of various kinds. One firm that imports chrome ore is the SwedeChrome Corporation in Malmo. That firm is developing a new activity and is going to have a greater need for chrome ore.

"In our planning for future purchases, we have looked at South Africa because that is the leader in the market," says SwedeChrome's managing director, Goran Wahlberg.

The firm is going to import chrome ore toward the end of the year, and over the past year it has contacted most sellers on the world market: South Africa, Albania, Turkey, the Soviet Union, Madagascar, and others. If the possibilities for importing from South Africa are cut off, SwedeChrome will get by as far as quantities are concerned. On the other hand, Goran Wahlberg is worried that the quality will be worse and the price will be forced up.

The Scandiamant Corporation is another firm which imports from South Africa. It manufactures synthetic diamonds and needs mainly two types of minerals.

"We will import from South Africa for as long as we can," says Kjell Nilsson, the managing director, who sums up his opinion of the possible trade boycott by calling it "baloney."

Scandiamant is making "certain inquiries" to ensure future production without imports from South Africa. Another solution is to process the minerals in a third country.

The Avesta Corporation was established 3 years ago and does not import from South Africa.

"We buy scrap from European trading houses," says information chief Kurt Lindholm.

It is hard to determine whether those firms, for their part, trade with South Africa. But Kurt Lindholm knows for certain that the firms his company currently buys from do limited trading with South Africa.

On 29 April, Parliament will take a stand on the bill ordering a boycott on all trade with South Africa. If there is a trade boycott, it will actually take effect on 1 October. And in 1988, Sweden's imports from South Africa will equal zero.

Total Swedish Imports from South Africa in the 1980's

_	 					 	
_	Year	Millio	ns of	kronor	-		
	1980		252		-		
	1981		233				
	1982		348				
	1983		393				
	1984		388				
	1985		412				
	1986		146				
		(January)	6				

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August 14, 1987

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